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ABSTRACT
As semiconductor technology scales into the deep submicron regime the occurrence
of transient or soft errors will increase. This will require new approaches to error
detection. Software checking approaches are attractive because they require little
hardware modification and can be easily adjusted to fit different reliability and
performance requirements. Unfortunately, software checking adds a significant
performance overhead.
In order to make software checking system more attractive, this dissertation
proposes three optimization techniques that reduce the overhead of software er-
ror checking approaches. The first technique uses boolean logic to identify code
patterns that correspond to outcome tolerant branches. We develop a compiler
algorithm that finds those patterns and removes the unnecessary replicas. In
the second technique we evaluate the performance benefit obtained by removing
address checks before load and stores. In addition, we evaluate the overheads
that can be removed when the register file is protected in hardware. The third
technique ESoftCheck composes of a set of compiler optimizations to detect and
remove ”non-vital” checks. ESoftCheck optimizes redundant checks, checks be-
fore loop induction variables and invariants and unnecessary checks on platforms
where registers are hardware-protected with parity or ECC. ESoftCheck also pro-
vides knobs to trade reliability for performance based on the support for recovery
and the degree of trustiness of the operations.
In the end, this dissertation proposes an interesing future work, which is to find
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a set of variables protecting which it can most likely catch harmful errors that
would cause Silent Data Corruption to the program. By ignoring non-harmful
errors, the cost spent on detecting them and unnecessary rollbacks can be saved.
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Dramatic increases in the number of transistors that can be integrated on a chip
will deliver great performance gains. However, it will also expose a major road-
block, namely the poor reliability of the hardware. Indeed, in the near-future
environment of low power, low voltage, relatively high frequency, and very small
feature size, processors will be more susceptible to transient faults.
Transient Faults, also known as soft errors, are due to impacts from neutron
and alpha particles or other random events such as internal noise on power sup-
ply and interconnections, electromagnetic interference and electrostatic discharge,
which change the logic values of latches or logic structures [11,12,18,20,60]. These
changes are temporary - they do not permanently damage the hardware. However,
they may result in the wrong program output: computing with wrong operands,
fetching data from a wrong address, following a wrong path, etc, may finally cause
the pragram to fail. Sometimes users may easily notice these faults if the pro-
gram presents abnormal behaviors; sometimes, however, the program will produce
the wrong otuput and the users will not know about it. The latter situation is
more harmful. It has caused costly failures in high-end systems in recent years.
For example, in 2000 Sun Microsystems reported that cosmic rays interfered with
cache memories and crashed server systems at major customoer sites, including
America Online, eBay [4]. In 2005, Hewlett Packard stated that on a 2048-node
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supercomputer in Los Alamos National Laboratory, a higher-than-expected num-
ber of single-node failures were observed and the primary cause of these failures
were transient faults induced by cosmic ray strikes [32].
The continued evolution of hardware toward smaller feature size, lower voltage,
and higher frequency suggests that soft error rates (SERs) will increase in the
future and transient faults will become a greater problem for future generation of
processors.
In fact, most modern microprocessors already incorporate mechanisms, such
as parity and error-correcting codes(ECC) for detecting or recoverying transient
faults in memory elements. However it is not enough to protect only memory
elements from transient faults. Recent studies [60] show that, by 2011 the soft
error rate in combinational logic will be comparable to that of unprotected mem-
ory elements (see Section 2.1.2 for a detailed discussion on the trend of SER rate
for SRAM/latches/logic). For processors that use parity or ECC to protect a
large portion of the memory elements on the chip, logic will quickly become the
dominant source of soft errors. This dissertation focuses on protecting the entire
processor against transient faults.
Error detection mechanisms are necessary to ensure that a soft error does not
go undetected and results in an erroneous computation. Once errors are detected,
it is often possible to use software schemes for error correction – the performance
of error correction schemes is not critical, as long as errors are not too frequent;
however, error detection adds an overhead to all computations and has to perform
efficiently. For this reason, we focus in this dissertation on error detection.
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1.1.1 Why Software-based Approaches for Error
Detection?
Hardware-based error detection is used on modern microprocessors to detect errors
in storage and buses. For example, for memory elements, redundant bits are
padded into each data cell in the form of parity or error-correcting codes (ECC).
Whenever the cell is updated, the checking bits are re-calculated based on the new
data; whenever the cell is accessed, the data is checked by the checking bits. In
this way, the storage structures are able to detect or recover from transient faults
occurred since the last update (or access). Generally, information redundancy
(eg. parity, ECC) adds a low overhead to performance and chip size. However, it
is much harder to use the method of information redundancy in the pipeline. For
example, the parity or ECC property will not hold when the data go through an
Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU).
In order to protect the pipeline, in the early 1990s, processor designers put
in-line checking circuits to protect every single logical unit, such as using parity
predictor to protect transformation logic and sequential controls, using residue
checking to protect arithmetic functional units, etc [10]. However, in-line checking
circuits need a lot of white space and requires high verification cost. This kind
of fine-grain fault detection strategy is also a nightmare when processor designers
want to make any small changes to the chip. Later when transistor technology
became off-the-shelf, processor designers chose to protect the pipeline at a higher
lever - the module level, such as IBM mainframes [61], HP NonStop [29] and
mission-critical computers [75,76], etc. These systems duplicate or triplicate their
pipeline or processor core. When there are results coming out of a pipeline stage
or the processor core, the out-going results are compared (results from the two
identical pipelines or processor cores) to detect errors. Comparing to logic-level
checking, module-level checking has a little bit longer error detection latency, but
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it is much easier for the processor designer to design and verify the new checking
logic.
However, for commodity processors which are cost- and energy- constrained,
the technology used in these extreme reliable systems may not be suitable. This
mass-market needs a fault tolerant technology that is cheap, ligh-weight and able
to cover the entire processor efficiently. There have been several proposals target-
ing this goal that introduce redundancy to the execution. Depending on whether
the redundancy is implemented in hardware or software, these proposals are clas-
sified into hardware-based approaches and software-based approaches (see Sec-
tion 2.2 for detailed discussion). Hardware approaches include auxiliary simple
checker processors [3, 9], redundant hardware threads [16, 35, 52, 67] and others.
Software-based approaches use the compiler to introduce redundant instructions
to the program and add checks before stores and other synchronization instruc-
tions to ensure that the execution is correct [42,53,54,56,68].
However, it is unclear whether such hardware cost is acceptable for commodity
systems. For such systems, software-based error detection may be a preferable
solution. Software-based checking approaches have the following advantages.
• Little Hardware Cost: Software-based checking approaches need little
hardware modification. Therefore,it does not have much extra cost on circuit
design and verification. In addition, when processors are upgraded with new
techniques, the checking system do not have to be trashed and designed from
scratch.
• Portable: Since the redundant computations are introduced by the com-
piler in the software-based checking approaches, if the compiler has support
for several platforms, then this checking system can be ported to other plat-
forms with just small changes.
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• Flexible: The main advantage of software-based checking approaches is
their flexibility: different trade-offs between performance and reliability can
be achieved on the same hardware, using different software approaches while
hardware-only solutions cannot offer the same flexibility. Such flexibility
can be used, for example, for achieving a higher level of reliability for large
clusters, built out of commodity components: a PC might be built to have
a mean time between undetected failures (MTTUF) of, say, 10 years; this
would result in an unacceptable MTTUF of half a week for a 1000-node PC
cluster. Alternatively, the flexibility may be used to achieve different levels
of reliability for different software components: one may not care about
undetected errors that will affect the PC display during a game, but may
want to avoid errors that will corrupt the file system metadata.
Unfortunately, software-based checking approaches add a significant perfor-
mance overhead. On Itanium, the fully protected code performs 1.41 times slow
as the original out-of-box code [53]; on X86 platforms where the register spill is a
big issue, the protection overhead is much higher: our experiments show that the
baseline fully protected code runs 2.16 times slow as the original code version (see
Section 6.4.2), and Reis et. al show a 3.22 times slow in their experiments [55].
Notice that, there is no apple-to-apple comparison between the numbers above,
because i) the above experiments are done using different infrastructures, ii) re-
dundant instructions are added at different compiler levels, iii) they make different
assumptions on possible faults. Numbers can only be compared when they are
obtained using the same experimental setup.
Although software-based checking approaches have some performance con-
cerns, considering their advantages, we still believe they have great potentials
to detect transient faults for commodity processors. In order to make software-
based checking approaches more attractive, this dissertation mainly studies the
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optimization opportunities in the software-based checking approaches with the
goal of reducing the performance overhead down to an acceptable level and at the
same time keep the same or similar level of reliability.
1.2 Research Goals and Contributions
As stated in Section 1.1.1, software-based checking approaches have great poten-
tials to detect transient faults for modern commodity processors bacause of their
advantages in cost and flexibility, though there are concerns on their performance
overhead. In order to make software-based checking approaches more attractive,
this dissertation focuses on optimization techniques that reduce the performance
overheads of software-based fault detection approaches, while taking into account
the following issues:
• Reliability Detecting transient faults is still the only functionality of a
fault detection framework. When working on reducing the performance
overheads, we need to think whether the optimization techniques affect the
fault detection capability and if so, how much is the impact. Furthermore,
since software-based checking approaches assume a software/system check-
point and recovery framework, it has be to guaranteed that the underneath
checkpoint recovery layer is always in a healthy state, meaning that when
an error is detected the checkpoint recovery framework is able to roll-back
and recover correctly. In this dissertation, “reliability” means fault coverage
and system recovery capability.
• Flexibility Flexibility is the main advantage of software-based checking ap-
proaches when compared to hardware-based approaches. To maintain this
advantage our optimization techniques need to be adjustable to fit different
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reliability requirements. When the reliabilty requirement is high, the opti-
mizationn will be conservative; when the reliability requirement is low, the
optimization can be more aggresive; in the limit, when fault protection is
not needed at all, the whole software-based checking transformation can be
disabled.
For this work we consider a baseline software-based approach that replicates
computing instructions and adds checks before stores and other synchronization
instructions to ensure that data stored in memory are correct [53,54,56,68]. With
this approach, the checking instructions account for a significant fraction of the
added overhead. For example, Reis et al [55] found that on average 46% of the
added overhead is due to the checking instructions. To reduce the overheads
and improve performance it is necessary to reduce the number of replicas and/or
checking instruction. The contribution of this dissertation is the proposal of sev-
eral optimization techniques to reduce overheads. These techniques include:
• The Use of Boolean Logic to Find Outcome Tolerant Branches
The Boolean Logic Optimization is based on the fact that programs already
have redundancy, and if the compiler can determine the programs sections
where such redundancy exists, it can avoid the replication and later checking.
We use boolean logic to identify a code pattern that corresponds to outcome
tolerant branches and develop a compiler algorithm that automatically finds
those patterns and removes the unnecessary replicas.
• The Removal of Address Checks
This technique is based on the observation that faults that corrupt the
application tend to quickly generate other noisy errors such as segmentation
faults [70]. Thus, we can reduce replication of the instructions that tend to
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generate these type of errors, trading reliability for performance. In this
study, we remove the checks of the memory addresses and discuss situations
where removing these checks affect little to the fault coverage. This occurs
when a check of a variable is covered by a later check to the same variable,
and thus errors in the first check will be detected by the later checks; and
in pointer-chasing, when the data loaded by a load is used immediately by
another load.
• ESoftCheck: Removal of “non-vital” Checks
ESoftCheck contains a set of novel compiler optimizations that identify and
remove the redundant “non-vital” checking instructions while keeping a level
of reliability similar to the one of the non-optimized code. ESoftCheck ap-
plies three classes of optimizations: i) it removes redundant checks. A check
of a variable, say v, is redundant if it dominates another nearby check of v
or of a variable whose value is a function of v; ii) it hoists out of loop checks
of loop-invariant or induction variables. iii) it removes checks that are un-
necessary when the register file is hardware-protected with parity or ECC.
Machines with hardware-protected register files include Intel Itanium [30],
Sun UltraSPARC [21] and IBM Power4-6 [5]. An additional benefit of this
last optimization is that the register holding the replicated register can be
deallocated earlier, reducing register pressure. As a flexible software-based
approach, ESoftCheck also provides knobs so that the user can trade reli-
ability for performance. With ESoftCheck the user can i) define what are
the commit points, and ii) specify the degree of trustiness of each operation.
The distance between commit points is important, because the larger the
number of instructions between commit points, the more redundant checks
can be detected and removed. The degree of trustiness affects the removal
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of checks on variables that are data dependent through trusted operations.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the background of
transient fault errors and the related work on transient fault tolerance. Chapter 3
describes the baseline software-based fault detection system and our environmen-
tal setup. Chapter 4 presents a technique to detect outcome tolerant branches and
its performance benefit. Chapter 5 describes the removal of address checks and
evalutes its impact in performance. Chapter 6 presents an overview of ESoftCheck,
the detailed compiler algorithms that ESoftCheck uses and the evaluation results.
Chapter 7 proposes future work on finding SDC-indicating variables and design-
ing an intelligent fault detector that can most likely to catch only harmful errors.
And finally, Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
Background and Previous Work
In this chapter, we first describe in detail the problem of transient faults and
the trend of transient faults problem as the processors scale down into the deep
submicron regime; then, we present previous works on tolerating transient faults
for commodity processors.
2.1 Transient Fault Problem
This section introduces the nature of transient faults. Section 2.1.1 presents the
definition of transient faults. Section 2.1.2 discusses the trend of transient fault as
the semicondctor technology scales down and addresses the necessity of protecting
combinational logic from transient faults.
2.1.1 Definition of Transient Faults
Transient Faults, also known as soft errors, are due to impacts from energy parti-
cles or other random events such as internal noise on power supply and intercon-
nections, electromagnetic interference and electrostatic discharge, which change
the logic values of latches or logic structures [11,12,18,20,60]. These changes are
temporary - do not permanently damage the hardware. However, they may result
in a program to run incorrectly by: computing with wrong operands, fetching
data from a wrong address, following a wrong path, etc, and finally cause the
pragram to fail. Sometimes users may easily notice these faults if the program
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presents abnormal behaviors; sometimes users will not know until the program
ends and produces a wrong output.
There are two sources for the energy particles: the decay of redioactive atoms
which exist in trace amounts in all materials and extraterrestrial cosmic rays
which bombard the earth constantly from the far depths of the galaxy. The
alpha-particle is proved to be the most upsetting ones in the decay of redioactive
atoms. When the 16Kb chip was introduced in 1977, the storage charge in memory
cells had been reduced to about 1M electrons, which is just the amount that an
alpha-particel can cause a sudden burst. In 1978, it was the first time that Intel
discovered that radioactive contaminants in the packaging of chips caused changes
in the memory elements of a processor [28].
The transient faults caused by cosmic rays was first discovered in satellites in
1950s. Solutions included covering the satellite with a gold “blanket” and encoding
the data streams with parity and handshaking during transmission. [77] Since
cosmic rays can penetrate the atmosphere, cosmic rays still play an importantant
role in causing transient faults on the earth. Because the cosmic ray flux increases
in intensity with altitude, the altitude of the processor has a significant effect on
the SER rate. A field test from IBM showed that SER increases more than 10x
going from sea level to two miles up [38]. If using New York City at sea level as
a baseline, the SER rate increases 4x when moving up to Denver, Colorado and
increases to 13x at Leadville, Colorado. At the altitude of airplane travel the SER
rate increases further to 300x. Decreasing altitude below sea level has the inverse
effect. For example, moving 20 meters underground reduces the SER rate to 3%
of sea level [1]. Although the layer of covering or putting computers underground
can help to shield cosmic rays and limit transient fautls, it is too expensive and
impractical for use widely.
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2.1.2 When Transistor Size Scales Down
The continued evolution of hardware toward smaller feature size, lower voltage,
and higher frequency suggests that soft error rates(SERs) will increase in the
future. On one hand, shrinking transistor size decrease the probability of collecting
the critical charge that is necessary to upset a circuit. On the other hand, the
critical charge itself decreases even faster, because of lower cell capacity and supply
voltage, leading to higher soft error rates(SERs). In the future, with technology
advancing both transistor size and critical charge will continue to decrease. Most
of the neutron and alpha strikes will be able to flip a bit within a cell because of
the very low critical charge. The probability of corrupting data in a particular
bit cell will decrease because of the lower area. However, the SER per chip will
continue to increase, because of the use of larger arrays [12].
Since it is impractical to place all processors underground to shield cosmic
radiation and it is almost impossible to insulate circuits from alpha particles
coming from packaging materials, transient faults will become a greater problem
for future generation of processors.
Most early studies focused on protecting memory elements from impacts of
transient faults. The main reason is that caches take up a large part of the chip
area. Thus the probability of energy particles striking a memory cell is higher.
As a result, most modern microprocessors already incorporate mechanisms, such
as parity and error-correcting codes(ECC) for detecting or recovering transient
faults in memory elements. However it is not enough to protect only memory
elements from transient faults.
Recent studies [60] show that, by 2011 the soft error rate in combinational logic
will be comparable to that of unprotected memory elements. Figure 2.1 shows
the predicted SER for each class of components for each technology generation
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Figure 2.1: SER of individual circuits*
and pipeline depth studied by Shivakumar et al. [60]. The x-axis plots the CMOS
technology generation, arranged by actual or expected year of adoption, and the
y-axis plots the SER for each element on a log scale. The SER is expressed in
terms of Failures In Time (FIT), which measures the number of failures per 109
hours of operation. On this figure, SER of a single SRAM cell decreases gradually
with shrinking feature size, while the SER of a latch stays relatively constant.
The SER for a single logic chain shows the most significant change, increasing
over five orders of magnitude from 600nm to 50nm.
If the Alpha 21264 microprocessor is used as the basis for constructing the
chip model, where approximately 20% of transistors are in logic circuits and the
remaining 80% are in storage elements in the form of latches, caches, branch pre-
dictors, and other memory structures, SER/chip can be computed and presented
in Figure 2.2. SER/chip of SRAM remains almost flat as feature size decrease.
SER/chip of latches increases only slightly for all pipeline depths. Similar to
1Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 are taken from Reference [60].
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Figure 2.2: SER/Chip for SRAM/latches/logic*
Figure 2.1 SER/chip in combinational logic increases dramatically from 10−7 to
around 102 as the technology evolves from 600nm to 50nm. We can also see that
at 50nm with 6 fan-out-of-4 inverter (FO4) pipeline, the SER/chip of combina-
tional logic exceeds that of latches, and is within two orders of magnitude of the
SER/chip of unprotected SRAMs.
For processors that use parity or ECC to protect a large portion of the memory
elements on the chip, logic will quickly become the dominant source of soft errors.
2.2 Previous Proposals For Transient Fault
Tolerance
As transient fault problem is rising for commodity processors, there has been a
rich body of proposals on transient fault protection schemes. Here we focus on
some of the key schemes using a hardware or a software approach.
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2.2.1 Hardware-based Approaches
Watchdog Processor Concept Watchdog processors proposes some of the key
concepts of many fault-tolerance schemes [27]. A watch dog processor is a proces-
sor that runs concurrently with the main processor, observes the main processor’s
outputs and inputs, and compares its own outputs with the main processor’s
outputs.
Redundant Multi-Threading Along with the recent popularity of SMT (Si-
multaneous Multi-Threading) and CMP (Chip Multi-Processor) processors, there
have been several proposals using redundant threads to check the correctness of
executions, on the same core (SMT) or on different cores (CMP). The basic idea
is very simple: run two copies of the same thread and check with each other.
Depending on the platforms (SMT vs. CMP) and the functionality (detection
and recovery), there are various proposals.
AR-SMT [57] is the first to use SMT to execute two copies of the same program.
Two threads are checked before an instruction commits at the trailing thread side.
The committed state of the trailing thread can be used as a checkpoint for recov-
ery. Slipstream [65] follows AR-SMT by extending the scheme to CMP. AR-SMT
and Slipstream propose using speculation techniques to allow coomunication of
data values and branch outcomes between the main the redundant threads to ac-
celerate execution. AR-SMT doubles the physical memory of a system: loads and
stores are performed twice by the two threads. Thus it requires operating system
modifications to manage the additional address mappings needed to replicate the
address space. SRT [52] introduces the concept of the sphere of replication; inputs
and outputs values that cross the boundary of the sphere require replication and
comparison respectively. If memory is outside sphere of replication, the leading
thread needs to replicate loaded values and copy these values to the trailing thread;
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only committed stores and uncached loads need to be checked. Another optiiza-
tion of SRT is to maintain a constant slack of instructions between the two threads.
SRTR [67] extends SRT to provide recovery for SMT. It checks more instructions
to make sure the architectural states committed by the trailing thread are always
correct and thus can be used to recover. CRT [35] exploits design options for
CMP. It proposes to replace the branch outcome queue with a little prediction
queue to help replicate the instruction stream in the trailing thread, and proposes
a per-thread store queue to enhance performance. CRTR [16] extends CRT to
provide recovery for CMP. To tackle inter-processor bandwidth, CRTR incrases
the bandwidth supply by pipelining the communication paths and reduces the
number of checks by using an advanced dependence-based checking elision over
SRTR. Fingerprinting [62] further reduces inter-processor bandwidth. It collects
the history of the execution of the processor in a hash-based signature and use
them to detect differences among dual modular redundant pair of processors.
There are other kinds of instrution-level replication on platforms other than
SMT and CMP. DIE proposes hardware recovery using superscalar hardware with-
out any SMT support [50]. DIVA [3,9] uses a very simple in-order processor as a
checker for a large out-of-order, speculative processor. DIVA’s checker is a com-
pletely separate processor. It is assumed always safe. As a result, DIVA’s checker
can detect permanent faults and design errors in the main processor as well as
transient faults.
Partial Redundant Threading Recently, several lightweight hardware re-
dundant thread approaches have been proposed to duplicate only a subset of the
dynamic instruction streams at the cost of possibly lower error detection and
recovery rate. The idea behind these approaches is to improve the overall cost-
effectiveness to make reliable computing practical. Weaver et al. [73] proposes two
techniques to reduce the cost: flush certain pipeline structures on infrequent long
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latency events, such as cache misses; modify the error reporting mechanism and
only signal dangerous detected errors that could possibly affect instructions. Go-
maa et al. [17] proposes an opportunistic scheme: use implicit redundancy through
reuse in high-ILP phases and explicit redundancy in low-ILP phases. DIE-IRB [44]
exploits instruction reuse to reduce redundant execution. Soundararajan et al. [64]
monitors the upper bound of the architectural vulnerability of Reorder Buffer
(ROB) online and provides control mechaanisms to proactively bound the vulner-
abilities to any limit specified by the system designer.
Prediction-Based Checking Prediction-based checking is a new direction
in efficient fault tolerance. Since errors may produce symptoms in the system or
may violate some localities, these symptoms or violations can be used as signs of
the appearance of soft errors. Wang et al. proposes ReStore [70], in which fault
detection is achieved purely by symptoms such as exceptions, cache misses, TLB
misses, and branch mispredictions. Li et al. [23] observes that most hardware
permenent faults cause anomalous behaviors as fatal hardware traps, segmenta-
tion fault, operating system hangs and high operating system activity, and pro-
poses to use these symptoms to find possible hardware faults. Reddy et al. [51]
combines confident predictions and partial duplication and shows that the combi-
nation can approximate the fault tolerance of full duplication. Parashar et al. [45]
uses the value and control-flow locality to predict instruction results; for the in-
structions whose results can not be predicted, it extracts their backward slices
and redundantly execute these slices.
2.2.2 Software-based Approaches
Software-based approaches basically adds replicated instructions at compile time;
checks are inserted to compare the two copies of the execution streams. Oh et al.
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proposes EDDI [42], a software system where all the instructions are replicated
and interleaved with the original ones. Checking instructions are inserted at syn-
chronization points and memory usage is doubled. Oh et al. later extends EDDI
by proposing ED4I that is able to detect some permanent errors [41]. In ED4I,
the replicated instructions “shift” the computation operands such that the orignal
and replicated streams may operate on different hardware units. Reis et al. pro-
poses SWIFT [53] and Profit [56] that improves over EDDI by taking advantage
of the current protection of the memory subsystem so that memory is not repli-
cated. They also add control flow checking. J. Chang et al. [7] uses transformed
replicas to recover errors in integer arithmetic operations and integer registers.
Wang et al. [68] is the first to apply software-based checking schemes to multi-
core processors, called Software-Based Redundant Multi-Threading (SRMT). The
compiler-generated replicated instructions and checking instructions are executed
on another core. SRMT defines two non-repeatable operations: system calls for
I/O operations and shared memory access operations. For non-repreatable oper-
atiosn, their return values need to be duplicated and their operands need need
to be checked at the trailing thread side. To give the compiler more freedom for
possible optimizations, the leading thread does not wait for the acknowledgement
from the trailing thread, except in situations where an error may have adverse
side effect to the outside world.
Some previous works provide ways to trade fault coverage for performance or
power consumption. The work by Oh and McCluskey [39] trades error detection
latency for power consumption by replicating selected function calls instead of
replicating all instructions of each function. However, this technique may not
benefit performance and it can only be applied to functions that do not update
memory or global variables. PROFiT [56] and Spot [55] select some sections of
the program to replicate. The selection is done based on a profile of the execution
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time and on the fault injection results for each section.
Hybrid software checking systems are proposed to mitigate the high cost in
pure software checking systems [47,54]. These systems use several special designed
hardware structures that were originally proposed in hardware redundant multi-
threading schemes. For example, a load value queue is used to check if the two
loads isssued by the original and replicated instruction stream are requesting the
same address and to make sure that these two loads get the same loaded value.
A store value queue is used to hold the stored value until two stores arrive and
check if the two stores are the same. With these hardware support, checks will be
done by the hardware greatly reduce the performance overhead. SRMT [68] also
evaluates their designs in two environment: one with a hardware value queue, the
other with a software queue. The design with a software queue is about 2.4x slow
down compared to the one with a hardware queue.
Compiler techniques have been used in other approaches for fault tolerance.
Meixner et al. [31] compute dataflow graphs at compiler time and use special
hardware to verify the dataflow when the program is executing. Nakka et al. [37]
select ”critical” variables through data dependence analysis, and use a hardware
redundant thread to check the slices that contribute to these variables.
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CHAPTER 3
Baseline Software Checking and
Environment Setup
In this chapter, we first describe the baseline software-based error checking model
and discuss emerging issues on addressing mode and fault coverage. Then, we
present our implementation method and environment setup.
3.1 Baseline
Software techniques for fault tolerance such as SWIFT [53, 56] assume that data
can be corrupted in arbitrary ways within the CPU but that memory and caches
are error-free; i.e., that the protection offered by techniques such as ECC and
memory scrubbing reduce the frequency of undetected errors to an acceptable
level. The software techniques detect CPU errors and prevent a faulty value from
being written to memory. The base approach for doing so is to keep two copies of
each register value, and to execute each operation twice, on different copies of the
data; errors are detected by comparing the two copies. Stores, branches, function
calls, returns, and loads are considered to be “synchronization” points where we
need to ensure that certain values are correct; checking instructions are inserted
before each synchronization point:
• Before a store, checking instructions verify the value and memory address.
This ensures that the correct data is stored to the correct memory location.
• After a branch, checking instructions verify that the branch takes the ap-
propriate path.
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• Before a function call, checking instructions verify the input parameters.
• Before a function return, checking instructions verify the return value.
• Before a load, checking instructions verify the address of the load. Then,
the loaded value is immediately copied to another register [7].
An example of the original and its corresponding augmented code executing in
the same thread is shown in Figure 3.1-(a) and (b), respectively. The augmented
code contains additional instructions that are shown in bold and uses additional
registers that are marked with a ’. Instruction 1 and 5 replicate the additions,
instructions 2 and 3 check that the load is loading from the correct address,
instruction 4 copies the value just loaded in r3 and instruction 6-9 check that the
store writes the correct data to the correct memory address.
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add r6 = r7, 4
add r6’=r7’, 4 (1)      
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add r6 = r7, 4
ld r3=[r6]
....
add r4= r3,1 
store [r6]=r4 
Figure 3.1: Example of baseline software replication and checking
Figure 3.1-(c) and (d) show an example of replicating the conditional branch,
where Figure 3.1-(c) is the original assembly code, and (d) is the augmented
code. Instruction 1 and 2 replicate the comparison and check if it is correct for
the control flow to take the not-taken branch; instruction 3 and 4 replicate and
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check the comparison on the taken branch. However, this type of checking is not
enough if the control flow jumps illegally. We will discuss this issue in Section 3.3.
3.2 Issue of Indexed Addressing
In the example of Figure 3.1 loads and stores use indirect addressing, so that the
register arguments contain the address of the memory location accessed. A slight
issue arises with indexed addressing, where the register specifies an offset, not the
address itself. An example is shown in Figure 3.2, where the original code is shown
in Figure 3.2-(a). In (ld r3 = c1[r1]), the address is the contents of the register
r1 plus the constant c1 that is part of the instruction. Our baseline replicated
code, shown in Figure 3.2-(b), will check the contents of the register (cmp r1,
r1’), as in the indirect addressing case. However, the test for r1 leaves open a
window of vulnerability in the address adder: an error in the implicit addition will
not be detected. Protecting the implicit addition is possible by replacing it with
an explicit addition and using indirect addressing, as shown in Figure 3.2-(c). The
addition is explicitly computed by instruction 1 and replicated by instruction 2.
Instructions 3 and 4 check if the addition is correct.
Although the version (c) may seem more reliable, errors are still possible: there
is a window of vulnerability between the check of the register value and the use
of this value. Also, the adder used in the address unit is simpler than the integer
ALU, and likely more reliable; it is not clear that the version (c) is significantly
more reliable than the version (b). In addition, on X86 platforms where the
indexed addressing mode has been massively used and optimized, version (b) will
be more efficient than version (c). Therefore, for the experiments carried out
in this dissertation, the replicated code in Figure 3.2-(b) is considered to be the
baseline.
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Figure 3.2: Example of replicating and checking indexed addressing memory ac-
cess
3.3 Issue of Fault Coverage for Software
Checking
Software-based instruction level replication can detect errors happening not only
to computational unit, register files but also to varied buses, combinational units
where the errors would propagate to the resulting value of an instruction. How-
ever, software-only approaches can not provide 100% fault coverage. In our base-
line and improved model, the following transient faults may not be detected.
I Strictly speaking, software checking is not fully reliable. Because an error
could happen after the check and before the store. For example, if an error
occurs after the check for store address and store value is done, and before
the store instruction executed, the error will propagate to memory without
being detected. However, software checking approaches reduce the window
of vulnerability where a soft error can cause a faulty value to be written to
memory.
II On a load, although memory is error-free it is still possible for an error
to occur in the path that brings the data from memory to the register file.
Replicating load instructions and loading from the same address twice would
be a solution. But in multi-thread programming environment, loading from
the same address twice can result in different loaded values, which has to
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be forbidden. A hardware Load Value Queue (LVQ) can better solve this
problem at extra hardware cost [35, 52, 54]. For the same reason, a store
path from register to memory is vulnerable to transient errors and that the
error may make the store value or store address wrong. A hardware Store
Value Queue (SVQ) can solve this problem with extra hardware cost.
III With the approach described in Section 3.1 branches are checked to verify
that they follow the appropriate path, but the program could follow an illegal
control path if the program counter is corrupted. Thus, additional testing
for legal control flow, done either in software or in hardware, is necessary to
ensure that the program counter is not corrupted [2, 25,27,40,43,66].
IV For function calls, our baseline replication checks the function arguments
before calls the function in the usual way. It is possible that the argument
is corrupted in the middle of the transfer. SWIFT [53] discusses this type of
vulnerbility and proposes a way to mitigate the error: doubling the size of
a function arguments list, giving two copies of each argument to the callee
and checking the arguments right entering the callee function.
V The software-based instruction level replication can detect most transient
errors to instruction op code, if the wrong-interpretated instruction gener-
ates a value that is different from the correct instruction. But, if an error
changes a non-store instruction to a store instruction, the error may propa-
gate to memory before it is caught; or if an error changes a store instruction
op to a null op, the store will not be executed and the error will not be
detected; etc. A hardware Store Value Queue can mitigate these errors.
VI If an error cause an exception that should not happen in correct runs, there
are two cases: if the exception handler finally returns, the error may be
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detected by the software inserted checkings; if the exception handler does
not return, the error will not be caught by inserted checkings unless we also
add checking instructions to the exception handler. An issue rises if the
exception handler makes changes to outside world (eg. I/O), the damage is
hard to recover even the error is caught by inserted checkings.
VII If software-based checking mechanism is implemented at source or interme-
diate level (we will explain why intermediate level is a reasonable choice in
next section), the libraries that are not available in source code can not be
protected in this way. There are two cases to consider. If the library call
does not make external changes, we can treat this library call as a huge in-
struction and replicate this instruction. Otherwise, we just leave the library
function open the vulnerability or protect these libraries using binary level
instrumentation as presented in [55].
VIII An error in micro-architecture may manifest in multi-bit error or multiple
errors in the architectual variables. Though our fault model aims at sin-
gle error upset (SEU), it is still likely that multiple errors will generate
unmatched pairs of variables and thus be caught by the software checkings.
In short, the software-based instruction level replication approach can not pro-
vide 100% fault coverage (though some errors can be mitigated by special hard-
ware support or more expensive software protection). We still think this kind of
non-perfect fault coverage is acceptable for commodity processor where its perfor-
mance and power consumption is equally if not more, important. Based on this,
we can sacrifice reliability a little bit for gaining much performance improvement.
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3.4 Environmental Setup
We use LLVM [22] as our compiler infrastructure to generate single-threaded codes
extended with redundant computations and the check operations. This extension
is carried out at the intermediate level, right after all the static optimizations
have been done. We replicate all the integer and floating point instructions.
Previous implementations have added redundancy at the backend, right before
register allocation [53,54] or via dynamic binary translation [55]. The advantages
of working at the intermediate level are:
I The redundant code can be easily ported to other platforms and other lan-
guages.
II We do not need to fully understand the assembly code for that platform.
III At the intermediate level we see a simple memory access model rather than
complex instructions like the ones in the x86 ISA.
To prevent backend optimizations to eliminate the added code we tag the
replicated instructions. The backend optimizations are applied separately to the
tagged and the untagged instructions. For the evaluation reported in this disser-
tation we use SPEC CINT2000 and the C codes from SPEC CFP2000, running
with the reference inputs. Experiments are done on a 3.6GHz INTEL Pentium 4
with 2GB of RAM running RedHat9 Linux.
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CHAPTER 4
Use of Boolean Logic to Find
Outcome Tolerant Branches
In this chapter we explain how to use boolean logic to reduce the amount of
replicated instructions. This technique is based on the fact that programs already
have redundancy, and if the compiler can determine the programs sections where
such redundancy exists, it can avoid the replication and later checking. We use
boolean logic to identify a code pattern that corresponds to outcome tolerant
branches and develop a compiler algorithm that automatically finds those patterns
and removes the unnecessary replicas.
We first do an overview (Section 4.1) and then explain the compiler algorithm
(Section 4.2), and finally presents the evaluation result and a short conclusion.
4.1 Overview
Our technique is based on the fact that programs have redundancy. For instance,
Wang et al. [69] performed fault injection experiments and found that about 40%
of all the dynamic conditional branches are outcome tolerant. These are branches
that, despite an error, converge to the correct point of execution. These branches
are outcome-tolerant due to redundancies introduced by the compiler or the pro-
grammer. An example of outcome-tolerant branch appears in a structure such as
if (A || B || C) then X else Y. In this case if A is erroneously computed to
be true, but B or C are actually true, this branch is outcome tolerant, since the
code converges to the correct path. The control flow graph of this structure is
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shown in Figure 4.1-(a).
The state-of-the-art approach to check for errors is to replicate branches as
shown in Figure 4.1-(b), where the circles correspond to the branch replicas.
However, we can reduce overheads by removing the comparison replica when the
branch correctly branches to X. If the original comparison in A is true we need
to execute the comparison replica to verify that the code correctly branches to
X. However, if A is false, we can skip the execution of the A replica and move to
check B. We will only need to execute the A replica if both B and C are also false.
The resulting control flow graph is shown in Figure 4.1-(c). In situations where A













































Figure 4.1: Eliminating replicated predicate evaluation.
Outcome tolerant branches also appear in code structures such as if (A &
B & C) then X else Y, and in general in all the code structures that contain
one or more shortcut paths in the control flow graph. A basic shortcut path is
edge(A->X) in Figure 4.2-(a), where both A and its child point to the same block.
However, most shortcut paths are more complex. For instance, in Figure 4.2-
(b), block A points to the same block pointed by its grandchild (not its direct
child). Thus, the optimizer should move A’ from edge(A->B) to edge(B->Z)
and edge(C->Y). The example in Figure 4.2-(c) can be optimized in two different
ways. If A and B are considered as a whole unit, edge(B->Y) is the shortcut path,
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A’||B’





























Figure 4.2: Shortcut graphs and optimizations
and the graph can be optimized as shown in Figure 4.2-(d); otherwise, it can be
optimized as shown in Figure 4.2-(e).
Detecting the existence of a shortcut path is not sufficient to determine that
there is an outcome tolerant branch. The reason is that one of the blocks involved
in the shortcut can modify a variable that is later used by instructions outside
the block. That block needs to be replicated or the error could propagate outside
the block. Next we show two examples:
(a) if (*m > 0) && (m < N) then X else Y
(b) if (t=(*m > 0)) && (m < N) then X else Y
In the example in (a), if (*m>0) is mistakenly computed as True, but (m<N) is
False, we can safely ignore the error on (*m>0) and take the Y path. However, if
the error occurs to the example in (b), and t is used in Y, ignoring the error will
result in a wrong value for t being propagated to Y, which may end up corrupting
the system. To avoid this type of errors our compiler algorithm only considers
blocks that are involved in a shortcut path and produce values that are only used
by the block itself.
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4.2 Compiler Algorithm
Our algorithm analyzes the control flow graph of the original program and extracts
the shortcut paths and the related blocks. A shortcut graph always has a head
node (block A in all the examples in Figure 4.2), one or more intermediate nodes
(like B and C), two or more leaves (like X and Y), and one or more shortcut paths.
Notice that in this paper we call a block to a single basic block or a list of basic
blocks connected one by one with edges of unconditional branches.
Our algorithm has two phases: first a search of all potential shortcut graphs,
and second, the optimization and appropriate placement of the replicas.
4.2.1 Shortcut Graphs Search
The searching process starts by classifying each block as an intermediate node or
a leaf, and building an intermediate node set and a leaf set. A block is called
“intermediate node” if it ends with a conditional branch and does not contain
side effects (does not contain a function call, a memory write or generates a value
used by another block). In addition, to avoid being trapped in loops, we require
that none of the outgoing edges of an intermediate node is a loop backward edge.
If the node does not classify as intermediate node, then it is considered a “leaf”,
meaning that this block can be at the most an ending node in a shortcut graph.
At the same time we build the intermediate and leaf sets, we also build a separate
head node set. A block is called ”head node” if it ends with a conditional branch
and none of the outgoing edges is backwards, no matter it has side effects or not.
Thus the head node set contains all intermediate nodes and some of the leaves.
After building the intermediate node set, the leaf set, and the head node set
the shortcut graphs are built from bottom up by scanning the head node set




















Figure 4.3: Constructing potential shortcut graphs.
contain temporary graph head nodes. For any node(A) in the head node set, we
check its two children (see Figure 4.3):
1. If the two children are leaves, this node is added to the graph-head-set
(Figure 4.3-(a)).
2. If one child is a leaf(X) and the other child is an intermediate node(B) and
node(B) is already in the graph-head-set, node(B) is replaced by the current
node(A) in the graph-head-set (Figure 4.3-(b)). We also check if the leaf(X)
is a child or grandchild of node(B), in which case a shortcut path for node
(A) is marked.
3. If the two children are both intermediate nodes((B) and (C)) and both are in
the graph-head-set, nodes (B) and (C) are replaced by node(A) in the graph-
head-set (Figure 4.3-(c)). We also check if (A) introduces new shortcut
paths.
The scan continues until all the nodes in the head node set have been visited.
Then, a node in the graph-head-set represents a graph led by this node together
with the shortcut paths found. A final pass traverses the graph-head-set and
removes those heads that do not contain any shortcut path.
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4.2.2 Optimization
After the shortcut paths are found we start applying the optimization, but we
first check when it is legal to perform it. In Figure 4.1-(b), our optimization will
move the replica A’ from edge(A->B) to edge(C->Y). However, this is only legal
if A dominates C. Otherwise A’ may use undefined values in the new position.
Thus to apply our optimization phase we first verify the domination relationship






























Figure 4.4: Optimizing shortcut graphs.
The goal of our optimization pass is to move replicas of the non-shortcut
path down to the edge/s between the last child and the leaf/leaves. Next, we
explain how this algorithm proceeds using the example in Figure 4.4. For each
shortcut graph in the graph-head-set the algorithm finds all the shortcut paths
(edge(A->X) in Figure 4.4-(a)), marks the replica ( A’) on the other path as
temporary (temp), and records the destination of the shortcut path (X). Next the
optimization pass scans all the intermediate nodes in the shortcut graph in a top-
down fashion, and moves temporary replicas from the incoming edges to all the
outgoing ones, except to those where the recorded destination of the replica and
the destination of the intermediate node that we are processing are the same (an
example is shown in Figure 4.4-(b)). Notice that when an intermediate node has
multiple incoming edges (as shown in Figure 4.4-(c)) we only move the replicas
that appear on all the incoming edges. Also notice that this optimization pass
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processes nodes top-down, and it does not treat multiple nodes as a single unit.
Thus, for the example in Figure 4.2-(c), the optimized version after this pass will
be the one shown in Figure 4.2-(e).
Finally note that A, B and C can contain computations like (s+1) == 5. In this
case, if the computations are only used to determine the outcome of the branch,




Figure 4.5 shows the performance speedup obtained when using boolean logic to
eliminate replication and checks on outcome tolerant branches (Section 4). Three
benchmarks (gzip, vpr, and perlbmk) achieve 7% performance gains, though the
average speedup is 1.6% through all tested benchmarks. Notice that there is also a
negative impact on vortex, where we observe more load/store instructions after the
optimization, meaning that this optimization introduces additional register spills
that hurt the benefit of less dynamic instructions. The reason for the additional
register spills is that during the optimization we move some evaluations down to
the control flow graphs, which may increase the life time of some registers.
4.3.2 Discussion on Reliability
We did not evaluate the change in fault coverage after this optimization, because
we believe that the boolean logic optimization does not lose fault coverage. Taking
the code structure in Figure 4.1-(c) for an instance, the discussion in Section 4.1













































Figure 4.5: Performance speedup with boolean logic optimization compared to
baseline replication
the correct destination is X) or detected (if the correct destination is Y). A question
rises, since A does not have a shadow copy in some paths after the optimization,
what would happen if an instruction opcode in A is corrupted. Notice that our
rule of constructing the short-cut path requires that A must not contain update
instructions changing values that are used by other blocks or outside, meaning that
the only output of A is the branch decision. Therefore, it makes little difference
after optimization if the instruction opcode is corrupted: if the wrong opcode in
A causes updating a variable, the error will be caught when the variable is used
and checked later because the shadow copy of this variable is not updated.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose the boolean logic optimization, which identifies some
sections of code that are fault tolerant by themselves and removes some evalua-
tions. The boolean logic optimization reduces the number of dynamic evaluations
and checks but may increase register spills. If the benefit of reducing checks over-
comes the loss from the extra register spills, performance gains can be seen. The
experiment results show that this optimization improves performance by around
7% for three benchmarks, and less than 2% on average. Therefore, we need to
use some heuristic to find which applications can benefit from this optimization
34
and apply the optimization to only these applications. The heuristic can be based
on how many patterns have been found, and how deep the short-cut graphs are.
Obviously, the more patterns that the optimization can be applied to, the better
performance we can gain; the shorter the short-cut graphs stand, the less regis-
ter spills the optimization transformation will introduce. Overall, with a good
heuristic, this optimization should always be applied, as it does not loose fault
coverage, and can improve performance.
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CHAPTER 5
Removal of Address Checks
This chapter presents the technique of removal of address checks. Since the tech-
nique transformation is very straigforward, we will focus on the motivation (Sec-
tion 5.1) and evaluation (Section 5.2), and finally conclude this technique (Sec-
tion 5.3).
5.1 Motivation
Recent experiments have shown that faults produce not only data corruption, but
also events that are atypical of steady state operation and that can be used as
a warning that something is wrong [23, 70]. Thus, we can reduce the overhead
of the software approaches and trade reliability for performance by reducing the
replication, hoping that the error will manifest with these atypical events.
In this chapter we consider the removal of address checks before load and store
instructions. Errors in the registers containing memory addresses may manifest
as segmentation faults. However, any fault-tolerant system must also include
support for roll-back to a safe state and thus, on a segmentation fault we can
roll-back and re-execute, and only communicate the error to the user if it appears
again. However, by doing this the system will be vulnerable to errors, since some
of these faulty addresses will access a legal space and the operating system will
not be able to detect the error. Thus, this technique will decrease error coverage.
Next, we discuss two techniques that the compiler can use to determine which
36
store [r6]=r4 
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add r4= r3,1 
....
Figure 5.1: Address check removal for being covered by a later check.
load and store instructions are most suitable for address check removal.
Address checks can be removed when there are later checks checking the same
variable. For example, in Figure 5.1-(a), checking instructions (1-2) and (7-8) are
checking the register r6. This makes the first check (1-2) unnecessary, because if
an error occurs to r6 it will manifest as a segmentation fault or will be eventually
detected by the checking instructions (7-8). We have observed many of these
checks in the SPEC benchmarks due to the register indirect addressing mode,
since the same register is used to access two fields of a structure, or because
two array accesses share a common index. Removing these replicated checks can
significantly reduce the software overhead.
Address checks can also be removed when the probability of error to the loaded
value is small. This case appears in pointer chasing, where the data loaded from
memory is used as the address for a subsequent load. An example is shown in
Figure 5.2-(a) and (b). In this case, since the processor will issue the second load
as soon as the first one completes, the probability of error is very small. In some
cases, however, the value loaded by the first load is not exactly the one used by
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ld r3=[r2]
















Figure 5.2: Address check removal for pointer chasing.
the next load, if not that it may be first modified by an add instruction. This
occurs when accessing an element of a structure that is different from the first
one. In this case, the probability of error is higher, and the checking instructions
will also determine if an error occurred during the computation of the addition.
An example is shown in Figure 5.2-(c) and (d).
In next section, we evaluate the removal of the address checks for only the
loads, or for both loads and stores. In the implementation, after removing these
checks, we also remove instructions that were originally servering the checks but
now are useless. We will show how much performance benefit we gain and how
much fault coverage we lose.
5.2 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our proposed techniques. We first analyze our tech-
niques statically (Section 5.2.1), evaluate performance (Section 5.2.2), and mea-
sure reliability (Section 5.2.3 and Section 5.2.4).
5.2.1 Static Analysis
In this section we characterize load addresses depending on whether the register












































Figure 5.3: Characterization of load addresses.
load was just loaded from memory (Loaded), as in the pointer chasing example
of Section 5.1. All the remaining load addresses are classified as (Other). The
breakdown is shown in Figure 5.3. On average more than 40% load addresses have
nearby later checks on the same value. About 20% of the loads use registers whose
contents where just loaded from memory. As we have discussed in Section 5, the
probability of error of any of these addresses is very small, because the processor
will likely issue the second load as soon as the first one completes. Also, if we
assume a register safe platform these checks are unnecessary. For the remaining
40% of the addresses, an error in the most significant bits will be detected as a
form of segmentation faults, but an error in the least significant ones can cause a
silent error.
5.2.2 Performance
Figure 5.4 evaluates the performance benefit of our check removal technique: base-
line Fully Replicated(FullRep), No checks for Address of Loads(NAL), No checks
for Address of Load and Store(NALS). All numbers are normalized to (FullRep).
After we remove checks for address of loads (NAL), we get an average 20.2%
speedup over the baseline Fully Replicated (FullRep). If we further remove checks

























Figure 5.4: Performance of the different optimizations normalized against the
original non-replicated code. (FullRep - Fully Replicated code, NAL - No Address



























































gzip vpr mcf parser perlbmk gap vortex bzip2 mesa art equake ammp AVG
unACE Detected Self-Detected Seg Fault SDC
Figure 5.5: Fault-detection rates break down. (O - Original non-replicated code,
FR - Fully Replicated code, NAL - No Address checks for Load, NALS - No
Address checks for Load and Store)
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5.2.3 Fault Coverage
Since we remove all the checks for memory addresses, memory can be corrupted.
In order to evaluate the loss of fault coverage, we use Pin [26] and inject faults to
the binary file (excluding system libraries). We assume a Single Event Upset(SEU)
fault model, that is, a single bit is flipped during the whole execution of the
program. Although our detection mechanism will very likely detect multiple bit
faults, the probability of multiple faults is much lower than SEU. Notice that to
accurately model soft errors, one should use a HDL simulator and inject faults
to buses, latches, combinational logic, and SRAM cells, among others. If this is
done, many injected faults would be masked and a few would manifest as errors
in the architectural status [58]. Here we report the result of injecting faults
into the register and status flags. In effect, we are modeling only those errors
that appear in the architectural status. We cannot inject faults that corrupt the
program counter, so we cannot model that type of errors. However, notice we did
not implement a mechanism to detect the illegal jumping in the control flow (as
explained in Section 3.3) because the target of our optimization techniques is not
the program counter. Finally, notice that a similar fault injection mechanism has
been previously used by other software checking approaches [7, 53,56,68].
In our experiment a total of 300 faults are injected into four versions of each
program: O - Oringal program, FR - Full Replicated version, NAL - No Address
check for Load, NALS - No address check for Load and Store. Although both
integer and floating point registers can be corrupted, in order to magnify the
impact of the errors we only inject fault to the 8 32-bit integer registers and the
status flags EFLAGS.
After injecting an error into the binary, the program is run to completion
(unless it aborts) and its output is compared to a correct output. Depending on
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the result the error will be categorized as:
• (unACE) the bit is unnecessary for Architectural Correct Execution [36];
• (Detected) the error is detected by our checking code;
• (Self-Detected), the error is detected by the program assertions;
• (Seg Fault), the error manifests as an exception or a segmentation fault;
• (SDC), Silent Data Corruption, when the program finishes normally but
the produced output is incorrect.
(SDC) is the first type of errors we want to prevent. Then, we also want to
avoid (Self-Detected) errors and (Seg Fault) because it can not be immediately
determined that the failure is due to soft error or some software bugs. But with
proper support, if we can roll-back and re-execute, these faults can be recovered,
so they are less harmful.
Figure 5.5 shows the experimental results for the random fault injection. No-
tice that the original program (O) has on average 75% (unACE) and less than
10% (SDC), which means that the software itself has a certain fault maskability.
After the program is replicated (FR), most (Seg Fault), (Self-Detected) and
(SDC) go to the (Detected) category. (SDC) errors appear because some faults
are injected before the value is used but after is checked. If we remove checks for
addresses, reliability does not drop much. If we remove checks for load addresses
(NAL), comparing to (FR), (SDC) increases from 0.36% to 1.08%, (Seg Fault)
increases from 4.47% to 8.05%. If we also remove checks for store addresses
(NALS), (SDC) rises to 1.44%, and (Seg Fault) rises to 9.02%.
Notice that after the program is replicated, about 20% (unACE) errors go
to (Detected) category. These errors corrupt application states such that they
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are detected by our inserted checks. However, these errors are masked by the
application and do not affect final program outputs in the end. When we remove
some checks, some of these errors return back to (unACE).
5.2.4 Fault Detection Latency
A software checking system always assumes a underlying checkpoint-rollback layer
which is in charge of checkpoint and recovery when an error is detected. A
checkpoint-rollback layer can hold a certain number of status updates after a
checkpoint is taken. When an error is detected, the checkpoint-rollback layer will
roll back to previous checkpoints and re-execute. It is very important that er-
rors are detected before the number of status updates reaches the limit that this
checkpoint-rollback layer can hold. Otherwise, the checkpoint snapshot may be
corrupted, in which case the checkpoint-rollback layer will not be able to recover
correctly even if the error is detected. In addition, if the number of status updates
the checkpoint-recovery layer needs to keep is large, the performance penalty of a
recovery will be high and will significantly impact the overall fault detection and
recovery system. Thus, it is important to bound the fault detection latency.
After removing the address checks, the fault detection latency increases be-
cause errors are now detected by later checks, by the operating system, or by the
application itself. In order to determine the detection latency, we inject faults
to the programs and measure the distance between the instruction where the er-
ror was injected and the instruction where the error was detected (the error is
detected by non-removed checks, segmentation faults, or assertion failures). Fig-
ure 5.6 shows the results. For each benchmark we show three bars. Each bar
represents the errors that cause segmentaion fault (Segfault), the errors that are
detected by our inserted checks (Detected), and the errors that fail programmer
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assersion (Self-detected), respectively. The total height of each bar shows the per-
centage of errors detected in each case with respect to the total number of injected
errors. Each bar is broken down into different colors depending on the detection
distance after the error is injected. We record a maximum of 100,000 instructions
after an error is injected. If the error is not detected within 100,000 instructions,
we let the program finish and report the final result of that execution.
Figure 5.6 shows that among (SegFault), on average 45.4% errors manifest as
segmentaion faults within 10 instructions, 78.8% within 100 instructions, 88.9%
errors within 1,000 instructions, and 90.23% errors within 10,000 instructions.
7.9% of the segmentation fault errors (equivalent to 0.9% of the total injected er-
rors) do not manifest within 100,000 instructions. Among (Detected), on average
73.9% errors are detected by non-removed checks within 100 instructions, 90.2%
errors within 1,000 instructions, and 96.6% errors within 10,000 instructions. Only
3.03% of the errors that are detected by non-removed checks (equivalent to 1.0%
of the total injected errors) do not manifest within 100,000 instructions. Among,
(Self-detected), 84.0% errors are not detected within 100,000 instructions. The
reason is that most of these errors appear in gzip and bzip2 where assertions are
checking if the compression or decompression correct, which takes long latency
to find the error. In summary, the technique of removal address checks does not
increase fault detection latency very much. After all address checks before loads
and stores are removed, around 90% of the detected errors are detected within
1,000 instructions. And only 4.6% of the detected errors (equivalent to 2.1% of









































































































































































Figure 5.6: Fault-detection latency for the version where address checks before
loads and stores are removed
5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate a promising optimization strategy where we let the
operating system to detect those cases that are likely to result in an abnormal
behavior (segmentation fault in our study). This optmization reduces detection
overheads since the error will be detected by the operating system with zero
overhead. We found that errors in memory access addresses fall in this category.
However, there is still the possibility that a faulty address is within a legal address
range, in which case the error will not be detected by the operating system. Then
we showed two cases where an error in memory access addresses is likely to be
detected by later checkings.
In our evaluation, we blindly removed all address checks for loads (NAL), and
then all address checks for both load and store (NALS). The results showed that
for NAL, we gained performance over fully replicated program by 20.2% while
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increasing SDC from 0.36% to 1.0%; for NALS, we gained 24.8% in performance
and increased SDC to 1.44%. Overall, the loss in SDC detection coverage is
acceptable, because the SDC of the original non-replicated program is as high
as 6%. More importantly, considering that this SDC rate here is the probability
of SDC over all manifested errors in architecture status, the real world SDC
probability that we can observe will be the result of a multiplication of the SDC
rate here by the raw SER rate and the probablity that an error will propagate to
architectural status. From Section 2.1.2 we see the raw SER rate is estimiated to
be 100 soft errors per 109 hours of operation per chip in 2011. Want et al. [72]
report that 15% of soft errors in processor state will propagate to architectural
status. Since both multiplication factors are small numbers, our SDC rate of
1.44% is acceptable.
In addition, we measured the fault detection latency for errors that cause
segmentation faults, assertion failure or are detected by our non-removed checks.
A software checking system assumes an underneath checkpoint-rollback layer to
do recovery. It is very important for the software checking system that errors
will be detected shortly enough so that the underneath checkpoint-rollback layer
is able to recover correctly. Our experiment results show that about 90% of the
detected errors (the errors that finally cause segmentation faults, assertion failure
or detected by our non-removed checks) can be detected within 1000 instructions.
And only 4.6% of the detected errors (equivalent to 2.1% of the total injected





From Chapter 5, we know that some checks for addresses are not vital: removing
those checks do not harm the fault coverage at all. One may have the following
questions. How to identify those “non-vital” checks for addresses? Instead of
removing all checks for addresses and losing certain fault coverage, can we remove
only “non-vital” checks? Besides checks for addresses, are there other types of
“non-vital” checks that can be removed? After such check removal, is the system
still recoverable?
In this chapter, we explore the above questions and present ESoftCheck, a
set of novel compiler optimizations that identify and remove the redundant “non-
vital” checking instructions while keeping a level of reliability similar to the one
of the non-optimized code. As a flexible software-based approach, ESoftCheck
also provides knobs so that the user can trade reliability for performance. With
ESoftCheck the user can i) define what are the commit points, and ii) specify the
degree of trustiness of each operation. The distance between commit points is
important, because the larger the number of instructions between commit points,
the more redundant checks can be detected and removed. The degree of trustiness
affects the removal of checks on variables that are data dependent through trusted
operations.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents an overview of ES-
oftCheck, Section 6.2 discusses in detail the compiler algorithms that ESoftCheck
uses, Section 6.3 discusses how ESoftCheck optimizations compares with previous
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instruction-level replication proposals, Section 6.4 presents the evaluation results,
and finally Section 6.5 does a short summary.
6.1 Overview of ESoftCheck
In this section we present an overview of ESoftCheck. Section 6.1.1 discusses
the type of checks that ESoftCheck can optimize, Section 6.1.2 describes the
knobs provided by ESoftCheck, and Section 6.1.3 discusses some of the issues
that appear.
6.1.1 Type of Redundant Checks
The added instructions in the augmented code of Figure 3.1-(b) can be classified as
either shadow copies of the original instructions (instructions 1, 4 and 5) or error
checking instructions (instructions 2, 3 and 6-9). The key idea of ESoftCheck is
the detection of redundant error checking instructions that are non-vital and that
can be removed while maintaining the same or similar fault coverage. ESoftCheck
uses compiler techniques to optimize four types of checks. Next, we describe them
(a more formal description is presented in Section 6.2):
1. Checks covered by a later check to the same register. A check of a
register is redundant if it is always followed (covered) by other checks of the
same value in the register at the time of the check, and the register has not
been modified in between the two checks. In such a case, one can remove
the first check, since an error will be discovered by the subsequent check(s).
The example in Figure 6.1-(c) shows the optimized code of Figure 6.1-(b)
(the same as Figure 3.1-(b)). Instructions 8 and 9 check the same register
as instructions 2 and 3, and the value of r6 does not change between the





add r4= r3,1 
store [r6]=r4 
add r6 = r7, 4 (1)      
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add r6 = r7, 4
cmp r6, r6’      
jne faultDet
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add r6 = r7, 4
add r6’=r7’, 4 (1)      
(2)      
(3)      
(4)      
(5)      
(6)      
(7)      
(8)      
(9)      
cmp r6, r6’      
(b) Baseline 
....
Figure 6.1: ESoftCheck removal of redundant checks of the same register, when
register file is not safe-(c) and when register file is safe-(d).
Notice that by removing the instructions 2 and 3 in Figure 6.1-(c), it is pos-
sible to load from a wrong address (what will result in a wrong value in both
r3 and r3’) or cause a segmentation fault. The error in the load address will
be detected when checking r6 in instruction 8 and 9, and we will know any
registers that have consumed the loaded value may be wrong. Section 6.1.3
explains how to handle segmentation faults resulting from transient errors.
2. Checks covered by a later check of a different register. A check of a
register is redundant when it is followed (covered) by a check of a different
register whose value is a function of the first register.
An example is shown in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2-(a) shows the original code,
and Figure 6.2-(b) shows the replicated code. In this example, it is possible
to remove instructions 1 and 2 that check register r1, because r4 is computed
by adding a constant to r1. An error in r1 propagates to r4, and is detected









































Figure 6.2: ESoftCheck uses data dependence to remove redundant checks of
different registers.
3. Checks of loop induction variables and loop invariants. Checks inside
loops can be made redundant and removed by adding covering checks at the
loop exits, thus reducing the dynamic check count. Figure 6.3-(a) shows a
loop where register r1 contains an induction variable. The corresponding
replicated code is shown in Figure 6.3-(b) where checks at the taken and fall
through paths of the conditional branch (instructions 4, 5, 6, and 7) verify
that the loop executes the correct number of iterations.
Figure 6.3-(c) shows the ESoftCheck code, where instructions 1 and 2 that
check register r1 have been moved outside the loop because the compiler
has determined that r1 contains an induction variable, and any error in the
loop will also propagate outside, where it will be detected.
4. Checks already protected by the hardware. The register file of current
platforms such as Intel Itanium [30], Sun UltraSPARC [21] and IBM Power4-
6 [5] are already hardware-protected by parity or ECC or can be protected
with cost-effective hardware mechanism [8, 15, 19, 33], In these platforms,
that we call register safe platforms, errors altering the values in registers
are detected by the hardware. Notice that we assume that the path to and
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ld r2=[r1]
(3)      
(4)      













cmp r7’, r8’ (6)      
jle faultDet      (7)      
LoopEntry:
(3)      
(4)      




jle faultDet      
jne faultDet      
(1)      
(2)      
(6)      
(7)      







jg faultDet      
jne faultDet      







jg faultDet      
ld r2=[r1]
cmp r1, r1’      
cmp r1, r1’      
(c) ESoftCheck(b) Replicated code(a) Original code
(2)      
Figure 6.3: Check removal for an induction variable.
from the register file is also hardware protected. Otherwise, there will be a
window of vulnerability.
Two types of checks are redundant in this case:
• Type I: Checks of registers defined by loads that have not been modi-
fied by arithmetic or logic operations can be removed. In addition, the
registers defined by loads do not need to be replicated, saving a copy
instruction and reducing register pressure. An example is shown in Fig-
ure 6.4. Figure 6.4-(a) shows the original code, a pointer chasing code,
where the data loaded from memory is used as the address of the next
load. Figure 6.4-(b) shows the replicated code and Figure 6.4-(c) shows
the optimized ESoftCheck code. ESoftCheck removes instructions 3, 4
and 5, because errors in register r1 are detected by the hardware.
• Type II: Checks followed by a check to the same register that has not
been modified. In this case, we delete the second check, rather than
the first one: if the first check succeeds, then the register is correct
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(1)      
ld r1=[r2]
      
(2)      
      
(3)      
(4)      
(5)      
(6)      
ld r3=[r1]
      
(1)      
(2)      jne faultDet      
ld r1=[r2]
cmp r2, r2’      
ld r3=[r1]
jne faultDet      
ld r1=[r2]
cmp r2, r2’      
ld r3=[r1]
jne faultDet      
cmp r1, r1’      
mov r1’= r1
mov r3’= r3
(a) Original code (b) Replicated code (c) ESoftCheck
Figure 6.4: Check removal when register file is safe.
at the place where the second check occurs. An example is shown in
Figure 6.1-(d) where the later check of r6 is removed and r6’ can be
deallocated earlier, reducing register pressure.
Notice that to simplify the discussion our examples only contain two checks and
simple data dependences, but ESoftCheck can detect more than one redundant
check linked by a chain of data dependences.
6.1.2 Knobs
ESoftCheck provides two types of knobs so that the user can trade reliability for
performance. The user can trade the number of redundant checks that can be
removed based on the frequency of checkpoints and the trustiness of operations.
Checkpoints
A fault tolerant system requires a checkpoint mechanism that saves snapshots of
the application state where to roll back if an error is detected. The commit points
are the instructions in the application where a new checkpoint may be taken so
that the space used by the previous checkpoint can be released. To be able to
properly recover, a checkpoint must not contain corrupted data. Thus, at commit
point we need to make sure that any possible error has been detected.
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The redundant checks that ESoftCheck can remove depend on the location
of the commit points. For example, given two checks to the same register the
first check cannot be removed if there is a checkpoint betwen the two checks.
An example illustrating this situation is shown in Figure 6.5-(a) and (b), where
the check operator consists of two instructions: a “comparison” instruction to
compare the contents of the register in the original code with the contents of its
replica and a “conditional branch” to an error handler if a mismatch is detected.
Similarly, when a commit point is inside a loop, checks of loop induction variables
and of loop invariants cannot be moved outside the loop. The only checks that
are not affected by commit points are those removed because the register file is
safe. An example is shown in Figure 6.5-(c) and (d). The reason is that in this
case ESoftCheck keeps the first check and deletes the last one. After the first
check it is the hardware reponsibility to detect any error to the register.
















non−safe registers    safe registers
Figure 6.5: ESoftcheck in the presence of checkpoints.
ESoftCheck provides knobs so that the user can specify the location of the
commit points. Notice that in general the more instructions between checkpoints,
the more likely it will be for ESoftCheck to find redundant checks that can be
removed, resulting in a larger reduction of the overheads. For this paper we
evaluate two different checkpoint frequencies, described in Section 6.2.4.
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Degree of trustiness
As explained in Section 6.1.1, a check can be removed when it operates on a
register whose value is a function of an earlier checked register. However, this
approach can mask some errors. For instance, if we have mul r4=r1,r3 and r3
is zero, by only checking r4 we will not detect if there is an error in r1. Thus,
we define Trusted operators as those that have a low chance of masking errors.
ESoftCheck can provide knobs so that the user can specify which operators are to
be considered trusted so that variable a can be checked through variable b, when
variable b depends on a through a chain of dependences that only involves trusted
operators. In general, arithmetic and shift operators are considered trusted. For
logic operators the probability of error propagation will depend on the number of
0’s and 1’s.
An interesting situation appears with the conditional move operator: cmov
r4, r3, cond copies register r3 to r4 if cond is true; otherwise it does not do
anything. We consider that it is not safe to check register r3 by checking the
contents of r4, because when cmov does not perform the copy, an error in r3 will
not be detected by checking r4. On the other side, since cond is computed as
the result of a comparison instruction that executes before thecmov, it would be
possible to check the operand registers of the comparison through a check of r4.
However, since the comparison only has two possible outcomes, an error in the
comparison operand register has a high probability of being masked. Thus, we
consider the cmov operator not trusted.
6.1.3 Issues
ESoftCheck can increase the number of segmentation faults with respect to the
Baseline Fully Replicated codes. The reason is that by removing redundant checks
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it is possible that some errors will manifest as segmentation faults before the error
is detected, that is, before the check that has not been removed is executed. In
these circumstances we will not know if the segmentation fault is the result of
a programming error or of a soft error. However, since the operating system
knows where the segmentation fault occurred and a fault tolerant system must
have a mechanism to roll-back to a safe state, we can roll-back and re-execute. If
the same error appears the operating system will notify of an error to the user;
however, if the error does not appear again, we can consider it was due to a soft
error or a software bug. Notice that the number of segmentation faults will not
increase in the case of optimizations due to register safe platforms, as the check
deleted is the last one.
6.2 ESoftCheck Framework
Our optimizations are implemented as passes on the LLVM intermediate level [22],
which is a SSA representation [14]. In this section we present the optimization
algorithms for the checks covered by the same or different registers (Section 6.2.1),
checks before loop induction variables and loop invariants (Section 6.2.2), checks
already protected by the hardware (Section 6.2.3).
6.2.1 Covered Checks
A check c1 of register r1 is covered by another check c2 of register r2 when
I c2 postdominates c1.
II Either r2=r1 or r2 depends on r1 through a chain of data dependences that
only involve trusted operators.
III There is no update to register r1 on any path between the two checks.
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Trusted operator makes sure that any error that occurs to its operand will
result in an error to its result, Strictly speaking, trusted operator must be a one-
to-one mapping from its operand to its result, Otherwise, there is a chance that
an error in its operand does not incur an error to its output, thus the error will
not be detected as a result. However, if extreme fault coverage is not required,
one may want to relax the requirement to be able to remove more checks. As
we have discussed in Section 6.1.2 ESoftCheck provides users knobs to determine
which operators are trusted, such that users can trade off between reliability and
performance.
If r1=r2 we say c1 is directly covered by c2; otherwise we say it is indirectly
covered. A covered check c1 can be eliminated if there is no commit point on any
path between c1 and c2. An example is shown in Figure 6.6. On Figure 6.6-(a)
and (b) c1 is covered by c2, but on (b) c1 cannot be removed because of the
commit instruction. On Figure 6.6-(c), c1 is not covered because c2 does not
postdominate. On Figure 6.6-(d), c1 is covered because the combination of c2










t = r op 8
(c2)check t
(a)
Figure 6.6: Examples of covered and non-covered checks
Next, we present the algorithm to detect covered checks that can be removed
(Section 6.2.1) and then discuss how to apply it based on the support for check-
point and rollback (Section 6.2.4).
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Algorithm To Remove Covered Checks
The algorithm to detect and remove Covered checks is a combination of the back-
ward data-flow problem (that determines the postdomination property) and a
data-dependence problem (that records data dependences through trusted oper-
ators). It is similar but different from classic Common Sub-expression Elimina-
tion(CSE) [34], in the following aspects:
I We can optimize the data-dependence case where two checks are checking
different registers, while CSE can not optimize if two expressions have dif-
ferent operands.
II We need to preserve the latest check for an error, while CSE preserves the
earliest evaluation of an expression.
III Commit point will kill all available checks in our case, while CSE does not
have such a powerful killer.
We define that check(r) is available at point P if on every path from the
program end to P, there is a check(t) at point P’ (t depends on r through a
chain of trusted operators, or t is r), and there is no update to r and no commit
point in between. To determine if a check(r) can be removed ESoftCheck will
determine if check(r) is available right after it appears in program order using
the algorithm described next.
The flow analysis of available checks will be discussed in two parts. First, we
present the intra-basic block (local) analysis, and then the global flow analysis.
• Local flow analysis.
Let ACAF (I) and ACBF (I) be the set of Available Checks right after and
right before instruction I (in program order), respectively. Let Chk Ins() be
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the instruction transfer function which computes ACBF in terms of I and ACAF :
ACBF (I) = Chk Ins(I, ACAF (I)).
Chk Ins() is defined as follows:
• If I is check(r), ACBF (I) = ACAF (I) ∪ {check(r)}
• If I is r=OP(t) and OP is a trusted operator, we will make check(t) avail-
able if check(r) is already available right after I. The reason is that an
error in t will be detected by check(r). In addition, since r is updated we
kill the availability of check(r). With this we propagate available checks
through chains of data dependence.
ACBF (I) =
 (ACAF (I) ∪ check(t))− {check(r)} , if check(r) ∈ ACAF (I)ACAF (I)− check(r), otherwise
• If I is r=OP(t) and OP is not a trusted operator, we kill the availability of
check(r). ACBF (I) = ACAF (I)− {check(r)}
• If I is commit point, all the available checks are killed, as they cannot
propagate across commit commits. Thus, ACBF (I) = ∅
• Otherwise, ACBF (I) = ACAF (I)
• Global flow analysis.
Let ACIN(B) and ACOUT (B) be the set of available checks on entry to and
exit of basic block B, respectively. Let Chk Blk() be the basic block transfer:
ACIN(B) = Chk Blk(B,ACOUT (B)).
Assuming that the basic block B contains the instruction sequence I1, I2, ...
In, we define Chk Blk() as
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ACIN(B) = ACBF (I1) (6.1)
= Chk Ins(I1, Chk Ins(I2, . . . Chk Ins(In, ACOUT (B)) . . .))
Figure 6.7 shows an example. For instance, at instruction 3 (r3=r1+16), check
(r3) is killed. In addition, check(r1) is made available because r3 depends on
r1 through a trusted operator and check(r3) is available right after instruction
3. Thus, when instruction 1 is processed, we find that check(r1) is available








r2 = load [r1];

















Compute: AC    (B)={chk(r1)}IN
Error will propagate from r1 to r3
OUT Given: AC       (B)={chk(r3),chk(r2)}
Can be removed
Figure 6.7: Available checks for a basic block
To guarantee the postdomination property a check is available at the exit of
a basic block only if the check is available on the entries of all the successor basic
blocks. Then, the data flow equations are:
(a) ACOUT (B) =
⋂
ACIN(S), over all successors S of B in the data flow graph
and
(b) ACIN(S) = Chk Blk(S,ACOUT (S)) (6.2)
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We use an iterative approach to solve the data-flow equations (a) and (b) [34].
Notice that the check removal can be applied while the available check analysis is
being applied. Initially, we define ACOUT for all the program exit blocks (ExitB)
ACOUT (ExitB) = ∅ and for the non-exit blocks (NonExitB) asACOUT (NonExitB) =
∪AC where ∪AC is the union of all possible available checks. The data-flow analysis
iterates until there is no change in any ACOUT (B).
When it finishes, we have ACOUT (B) for every basic block B and ACAF (I) for
every instruction I. Thus, given a check(r), if check(r) ∈ ACAF (I), this check is
covered and can be safely removed. Finally, notice that the check removal can be
applied while the available check analysis is being applied.
• An efficient and practical way to compute the block transfer function.
From Equation 6.2, we can see that the transfer function function Chk Blk()
will be called every time when the available checks for block S ACOUT (S) are
updated. Thus it is very inefficient to follow Equation 6.1 and sweep every in-
struction in the block when Chk Blk() is called. We will present an efficient way
that calculates Chk Blk() for each block only once.
First we define Gen(i) and Kill(i) for each instruction i. A check(r) generates
an entry in Gen(i). A definition of a variable r generates an entry in Kill(i).
A“commit point” kills all the checks. To remember the data dependences through
trusted operators, we introduce a third set that we call Cover(i). If t is defined
based on r through a trusted operator (t = OP (r)), then a check(r) will be
available if check(t) is available. Thus, when we find such type of instruction
we add a pair (r/t) to Cover(i), meaning that check(r) is indirectly covered by
check(t).
Figure 6.8 shows an example of how to define the three sets. For instance,
instructions 5 (check (r2)) generates a check of r3, whereas instruction 4 (r3 =
r1 + 82), kills r3 and adds the pair (r1/r3) to Cover(i) meaning that check(r1)
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is indirectly covered by check(r3). This information is necessary because when
processing instruction 4 to compute the available checks, check(r1) will be made
available if check(r3) is available. By making check(r1) available and earlier
check(r1)(in program order) will be covered and could be removed.
Next we compute Gen(B), Kill(B), and Cover(B) for each basic block B. For
that we traverse backwards all the instructions in block B, and recursively apply
the transfer functions in Figure 6.9. An example of applying the transfer function
is shown on the right part of Figure 6.8. The scan starts at instruction 7 and
proceeds backwards. Notice that when instruction 2 is processed we know for sure
that check(r1) is available, so we can remove the pair (r1/r3) from the Cover set
and add r1 to Gen set. When instruction 1 is processed, we see that check(r1)



























r2 = load [r1];
check r3;
r3 = r1 + 82;
r4 = load [r3]; {r4}





   {r4} 
{r1}
Figure 6.8: An example of computing block transfer function Chk Blk().





OP is safe operator







































II    CoverALLKillGen }{SynchronizationCheckpoint
Transfer function for entire blockType of i2
*Instruction i2 is right before instruction i1 in program order.
Figure 6.9: Rules to compute Gen(B), Kill(B), and Cover(B).
ACIN(B) = (r|(r/d) ∈ Pend(B), d ∈ ACOUT (B))⋃
Gen(B)⋃
(ACOUT (B)−Kill(B)) (6.3)
With the new Equation 6.3, the old data flow Equation 6.2 shall be updated
as follows:
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(a) ACOUT (B) =
⋂
ACIN(S), over all successors S of B in the data flow graph
and
(b) ACIN(S) = (r|(r/d) ∈ Pend(S), d ∈ ACOUT (S))⋃
Gen(S)⋃
(ACOUT (S)−Kill(S)) (6.4)
Since Gen(S), Kill(S) and Pend(S) are fixed after scanning of all instructions
in block S for one time, Whenever ACOUT (S) is updated and we need to re-
calculate ACIN(S), we can directly use these three sets without scanning every
instruction of the block again.
6.2.2 Loop Checks
Our algorithm detects loop induction variables and loop invariants and move the
checks of these variables outside the loop. Induction variables are variables whose
successive values form an arithmetic progression in a loop. In the SSA form, loop
induction variables are defined by cycles involving φ(Phi)-functions [74].
In our implementation we first apply loop strength reduction [34] so that some
operations like multiplications are replaced by additions. Then, we scan φ(Phi)-
functions in the loop header node. Given r = φ((pre−header, r0), (backedge, r2)),
if r2 is defined as r plus(or minus) a loop constant, we consider r as a loop
induction variable. Then, the check of the induction variable inside the loop can
be moved outside the loop. Similarly, checks of loop invariants are also moved
outside. This optimization is only applied to loops that do not contain commit
points.
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6.2.3 Hardware Protected Checks
As explained in Section 6.1.1-4, on register safe platforms there are two types of
checks that can be optimized.
• Case 1. If register r is defined by a load, r does not need to be replicated,
and checks on r can be removed.
• Case 2. After a check c on register r, r’ can be deallocated, and any later
check on register r can be removed.
We unify the two cases by defining that register r is safe at point P if r
is defined by a load or there is a check on r at point Q, such that Q dominates
P and r does not change on any path between point Q and point P. If we know
register r is safe at point P, a check on r(at P) can be removed, and the use of r’
(at P) can be replaced by r.
Notice that safe register optimization is independent of where commit points
are (See Section 6.1.2).
The problem of determining what registers are safe at a given point is a for-
ward data-flow problem. Similar to the available expression problem, we use
GENSR(B) to denote the set of generated safe registers in block B that are not
redefined at its exit and KILLSB(B) to denote the set of registers that are killed
by block B. To compute GENSR(B), we scan block B from beginning to end, ac-
cumulating the generated safe registers (the register is defined by a load or there
is a check on it), and deleting those that are assigned new values in the block.
Then, we use SRIN(B) and SROUT (B) to represent the set of safe registers on
entry to and exit from block B, respectively. A register is safe on entry to block
B if it is safe at the exits of all predecessor blocks. A register is safe at the exit
from a block if it either generated in the block and not subsequently killed in it,
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SROUT (Si), where Si is predecessor of B.
SROUT (B) = GENSR(B) ∪ (SRIN(B)−KILLSR(B))
For the data-flow analysis, we initialize SRIN(Entry) = ∅, and for non-entry
block B SRIN(B) = USR where USR is union of all generated safe registers.
6.2.4 Knobs
• Checkpoints: ESoftCheck determines the covered checks that can be elim-
inated based on the location of the commit points. As explained in Sec-
tion 6.1.2 checks cannot be delayed across commit points. In this paper, we
evaluate two checkpoint frequencies. To compare with previous proposals,
we follow their approach: a program is considered correct if its output is
correct (assuming memory-mapped I/O), that is, if all the stores have ex-
ecuted correctly [47, 53–55]. Under this approach stores, function calls and
function returns are commit points and checks cannot be delayed across
commit points. As a result, checks can only be removed before loads. We
call this model MemUnPolluted.
To show the flexibility of ESoftCheck we also evaluate another system that
we call MemCheckpoint, where commit points are function calls and func-
tion returns. With MemCheckPoint stores are not commit points and mem-
ory can be corrupted with wrong values. Thus, a mechanism for memory
checkpointing either in software [6] or in hardware, such as ReVive [48] or
SafetyNet [63] is necessary.
• Degree of Trustiness: With ESoftCheck the user can specify which are
the trusted operators. For the experiments in Section 6.4 arithmetic, shift
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and logic operators are trusted operators, while the conditional move oper-
ators are not. Due to space limitations, we do not evaluate the impact on
performance or reliability of the degree of trustiness.
6.3 Compared to Previous Work
6.3.1 Difference From DBCE
Instruction-level replication can also be implemented in hardware. From Sec-
tion 2.2.1, we see that the Redundant Multi-Threading schemes run two copies of
the same thread and check with each other. Depending on detection or recovery,
different schemes do checks at various places.
In AR-SMT [57] two threads are checked before an instruction commits at
the trailing thread side. The committed state of the trailing thread can be used
as a checkpoint for recovery. SRT [52] and CRT [35] checks only committed
stores and uncached loads, assuming that an error will eventually propagate to
stores or uncached loads or it will not affect the program result at all. SRT and
CRT does not support recovery, in that every architectual state is committed
before check. When an error is detected, no one knows which architectural state
is correct. When error recovery is considered, the number of checks increases
significantly because the trailing thread is used to recover. Thus, every instruction
in the trailing thread needs to be checked before it commits. To reduce the
number of checks, SRTR [67] proposes the use of “Dependence-based Checking
Elimination”, that exploits register dependence chains, so that only the value
of the last instruction in a chain is checked. CRTR [16] finds that instructions
that mask operand bits may mask faults and limit the use of dependent chains. It
proposes Death- and Dependence-Based Checking Elision (DDBCE), which chains
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removed
r4 = r6 & 0x2;
r6 = ... check(r6)
check(r4)
(r6 has no other use)






(r6 has no other use)
(a)CRTR: check(r6) can be removed (b)ESoftCheck: check(r6) can not be
Figure 6.10: Example of difference between ESoftCheck and CRTR on
Dependence-based checking elision.
a masking instruction only if the source operand of the instruction dies after the
instruction.
Our optimization to remove the covered checks by a later check to a different
register (second type of checks in Section 6.1.1) exploits a similar idea as DECE
(DDBCE is not applicable). The reason is that the checks ESoftCheck tries to
remove are before loads, stores or other synchronization instructions, so more
considerations need to be taken into account when optimizing these checks.
Taking Figure 6.10-(a) as an example, in CRTR, if r6’s consumer r4 masks r6,
but r6 only has one consumer, check(r6) can be removed. Because even if there
is an error in r6 and the error is not caught by check(r4), the error is not visible
beyond this point and has not bad impact at all. But in ESoftCheck (example
shown in Figure 6.10-(b)), check(r6) must be followed by a synchronization in-
struction that uses r6 (ld r1=[r6] in this example). If check(r6) is removed, in
case an error happens to r6 that makes “ld r1=[r6]” fetch a wrong value, and
check(r4) does not catch this error, then the error that propagated to r1 will not
be detected and may cause trouble.
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6.3.2 Benefit for Software-Only and Hybrid Solutions
ESoftCheck compiler techniques are beneficial for both software-only and hybrid
(software/hardware) fault tolerant solutions.
Software-only solutions applied to single-core [7,53] benefit from a lower regis-
ter pressure and a reduction in the number of comparison and branch instructions
executed. Since ESoftCheck maintains full fault coverage, it can be applied in
combination with some partial replication schemes. For example, PROFit [56]
and Spot [55] selectively replicate some sections of a program. ESoftCheck opti-
mizations can be applied to the replication on those selected sections to achieve
better performance.
For multi-core environment [68], checks are inserted before system calls for I/O
operations and shared memory access operations. The leading thread sends the
value that needs to be checked to the trailing thread, and the check is performed
at the trailing side. In most cases, the leading thread continues without waiting
for the checking acknowledgement. But in some cases, if the error may affects I/O
or other threads, the leading thread has to wait for the checking acknowledgement
before proceeds. Once the checking fails, the leading thread fail-stops immediately.
ESoftCheck can not remove these fail-stop checks, because otherwise the error may
already propagate to I/O or outside before it is detected. In SRMT’s definition,
fail-stop checks check volatile loads/stores and shared stores. ESoftCheck can
optimize non-failstop checks. Figure 6.11-(a) gives an example of how covered-
check removal optimizes on SRMT. The check on r1 can be removed because an
error in r1 will be detected by the check on r3. Therefore, one data communication
and one check are saved. [68] reports that the leading thread dominates the
SRMT execution time, so the save on trailing checks may not help the performance
much. But the save on cross-core communication bandwidth is projected to be
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check r1’ and r1
//compute r1 //compute r1





check r3’ and r3
r3=r1+4
send r4 receive r4
send r1






check r1’ and r1
signal(ack)wait(ack)
//compute r1




check r3’ and r3
send r3 receive r3’
r3=r1+4 r3=r1+4
......send r2 receive r2
ld r2=[r1]
([r1] is shared memory location)
(a)Can optimize on non−failstop checks
Figure 6.11: Example of applying covered-check removal for SRMT.
important for multi-core processors. As for the example shown on Figure 6.11-
(b), since [r1] is a memory-mapped I/O address, a fail-stop check on r1 must be
inserted before leading thread performs the load. In this case, ESoftCheck can no
optimize.
In the case of hybrid solutions [47, 54], ESoftCheck reduces the number of
hardware checks, and lowers register pressure.
6.4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our proposed techniques. We first characterize the
number of static checks that can be removed (Section 6.4.1), evaluate performance
(Section 6.4.2), and measure reliability (Section 6.4.3).
6.4.1 Characterization of Static Checks
In this section, we characterize the static checks that can be removed. A break-
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Figure 6.12: Characterization of static checks for each type of instruction (MemU-
nPolluted).
three bars characterize the checks based on the type of instruction they guard:
load (ld), store (st), and function call and return (other). The last bar (to) cor-
responds to the sum of all the checks in the three previous bars. The bars are
normalized to the total number of checks for each type of instruction. A check is
categorized according to the reason why it can be removed: (i) because it is cov-
ered by another check to the same or different register (Covered), (ii) because it is
before a loop induction variable or loop invariant (Loop), (iii) because the register
file is safe (SafeReg). The checks that cannot be removed appear as (NotRem).
For the characterization we assume the MemUnPolluted model described in Sec-
tion 6.2.4.
Notice that a given check may belong to Covered and RegSafe at the same
time. However, in our characterization this check appears as Covered, since the
pass that detect Covered checks is applied first. The first observation we make
is: (1) with the MemUnPolluted model only the covered checks before loads can
be removed. The removed checks in this case account for 42.8% of the checks
before loads and 19.1% of the total number of checks; (2) the fraction of checks
that guard loop induction variables and loop invariants is very small; (3) when
the register file is safe, an average of 32.1% of the checks can be removed.
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6.4.2 Performance
Figure 6.13 shows the performance benefit of different optimizations: Fully Repli-
cated (FullRep), removal of checks that are covered by another check to the same
or different register (Covered), removal of checks because the register file is safe
(SafeReg), and removal of checks before loop induction variables and invariants
(Loop). The first five bars of each application correspond to the MemUnPolluted
model where stores, function calls and function returns are considered commit
points. In addition, we also show performance numbers for the MemCheckPoint
(MemChkpt) model, where commit points are function calls and function returns.
The Fully Replicated code (FullRep) is on the average 2.16 times slower than
the original code. This large overhead is due to several reasons:
I Register pressure. the replicated code needs twice more registers than the
original application, and the x86 ISA only has 8 registers available to the
compiler.
II The additional instructions.
Previous works have published smaller overheads for FullRep [7, 53, 54] but
in that work the target machines were Itanium or PowerPC platforms that have
a larger number of registers. On the average, (Covered) runs 6.9% faster than
(FullRep), but only checks before loads can be removed in this case. We have
also removed all the checks before loads (not shown in the Figure), and found
out that the average normalized execution time is 1.82 (versus 2.02 of Covered).
Thus, (Covered) reduces 41.2% of the overhead introduced by checking the load
address.
The safe register optimization (SafeReg) obtains a high performance benefit
because it can remove redundant checks and reduce register pressure. On the





















































































































































































The optimization before induction variables and loop invariants (Loop) results
in little performance gain. The reason is that we impose many constrains and so
the optimization is applied to only a few loops.
When we combine the three optimizations together (Covered+Loop+RegSafe),
there are some checks that can be optimized with both (Covered) and (SafeReg).
However, since (SafeReg) removes the second check, reducing register pressure,
when both (Covered) and (SafeReg) can be applied, we apply the (SafeReg) opti-
mization. The combination of the three optimizations achieves on average 27.1%
speedup compared to (FullRep), resulting in a code that runs 1.70 times slower
than the original code. Under the MemCheckPoint model (last two bars in Fig-
ure 6.13) where checks before store can also be removed, the (Covered) optimiza-
tion has on average 10.7% speedup over (FullRep) and the combination of all
optimizations achives on average 31.7% speedup compared to (FullRep).
Notice that FullRep corresponds to state of the art approaches such as SWIFT [53]
that use only software checking and no special hardware for error detection.
Under the MemUnPolluted model, when applying all our optimizations (Cov-
ered+Loop+SafeReg) the overhead is reduced from 116% to 70%, and the only
hardware support that we need is parity or ECC in the register file (that is already
in many processors).
Notice that with 70% overhead, we have full protection on integer, floating
point instructions, as well as conditional branches. And the memory is guaranted
not to be corrupted. The only hardware support we need is parity or ECC in
register files, which is already there in most server processors in today’s market.
If we have advanced hardware support, such as store value queue [47, 54] and
branch protector [47], we can achieve better performance in that the hardware
takes over the job of checking for store and branches.
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6.4.3 Reliability
To evaluate the reliability of our optimizations, we use the same fault injection
method described in Section 5.2.3: we use Pin [26] and inject faults to the binary
file (excluding system libraries) assuming a Single Event Upset (SEU) fault model.
In our experiments a total of 2000 faults were injected into each program.
Again, to magnify the impact of the errors we only inject faults to the 8 32-bit
integer registers and the status flags EFLAGS. The difference is that since we have
proposed an optimization on safe-register platforms, we shall model that platform
in our evaluation.
When we assume that the register file is not protected in hardware, we mimic
the fault distribution by randomly selecting a point in the execution sequence and
flipping a random bit in a random register. When we assume that the register file
is protected in hardware, we mimic the fault distribution by randomly selecting
a dynamic instruction and randomly flipping a bit of its “output”. The output
can be in a register or in memory if it has been spilled. Memory load instructions
are avoided. We call the first scheme “random fault injection” and the second
one “safe register fault injection”. Notice that in practice fault distribution is
not uniform, but it is a first order approximation used by previous fault injection
approaches [53,54,70].
After injecting an error into the binary, the program is run to completion
(unless it aborts) and its output is compared to a correct output. Depending on
the result the program will be categorized as: (unACE): the bit is unnecessary
for Architectural Correct Execution [36]; (Detected): the error is detected by our
checking code; (Self-Detected): the error is detected by the program assertions;
(SDC): Silent Data Corruption, when the program finishes normally but the pro-
duced output is incorrect. (SDC) is the first type of errors we want to prevent.
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Then, we also want to avoid (Self-Detected) errors and minimize (Seg Fault), but
these faults can be recovered, so they are less harmful.
Figure 6.14-(a) and (b) show the experimental results for random fault injec-
tion and safe register fault injection, respectively. on average 72% of the faults
appear as (unACE), 3% as (Self-Detected), 19% resulted in (Seg Fault) and 6%
are (SDC). Under the safe register scheme (Figure 6.14-(b)) more faults result
in SDC (9% over 6%). The reason is that the random scheme is more likely to
select a dead register. It is also interesting to notice that gzip and bzip2 have
a large fraction of Self-Detected errors (10% and 24%, respectively under the
random injection scheme) because the program checks the data consistency af-
ter the data is compressed or decompressed. Many other real world programs
have programmer-inserted assertions as well. These assertions represent another
optimization opportunity where some checks can be removed. However, in this
dissertation we did not apply any special optimization to handle the Self-Detected
errors.
As expected after the program is replicated (Fr), most (Seg Fault), (Self-
Detected) and (SDC) go to the (Detected) category. Also, many unACE errors in
the original (O) program appear as (Detected) because they are now detected by
the checks added. (Fr) has 4.7% and 1.1% of (Seg Fault) under the random reg-
ister injection scheme and the safe register injection scheme, respectively. (SDC)
errors appear under the random register injection scheme because some faults are
injected before the value is used but after is checked. (SDC) errors do not appear
under safe register injection scheme. After our optimization, ESoftCheck does not
produce more (SDC) or (Self-Detected) errors than (Fr). As for (Seg Fault), under
the random fault injection scheme, ESoftCheck generates slightly more than (Fr)
(5.5% of ESoftCheck versus 4.7% of Fr). Under the safe register fault injection
scheme, the (Seg Fault) for ESoftCheck is 3.0% versus 1.1% of (Fr). Remember
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that (Seg Fault) is recoverable by rolling back and re-executing, so these numbers
are acceptable.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented ESoftCheck, a set of compiler techniques that
reduce the overheads of software approaches for fault tolerance by removing non-
vital checks. To the best of our knowledge ESoftCheck is the first work that
identifies the checks before loads, stores and synchronization instructions that can
be removed without sacrificing fault coverage. ESoftCheck also takes into account
the location of checkpoints, so that recovery is not compromised. When the
register file is hardware-protected ESoftCheck can not only remove many checks
but also deallocate replicated registers, reducing register pressure significantly.
As a result, in a system that we call MemUnPolluted (where stores execute
correctly and memory is not corrupted with wrong results) our techniques re-
duce execution time by 27.1% over previous state of the art software checking
approaches (overheads are reduced from 116% to 70%). Among the three pro-
posed optimizations, the Safe Register optimization is the one that works the best.
The reason is that this optimization can reduce register pressure by deallocating
some shadow registers early, and register pressure is the major source of overheads
on the X-86 platform where we did our experiments. This optimization requires
hardware protection (parity or ECC) on register files. Since most modern high end
professors already incorporate such hardware protection, the 27.1% performance
speedup can be obtained on these processors without hardware modifications.
If full fault coverage is required and the budget of design cost is tight, then
software checking is the only viable solution at the expense of a high performance








































































































































































































































































































































































































niques can greatly reduce the overhead to 70%. If full fault coverage is not re-
quired, ESoftCheck can be easily combined with some partial replication schemes
to achieve higher performance gains.
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CHAPTER 7
Future Work: Detecting Only
Harmful Errors
Not all transient faults will do harm to programs. For the non-harmful errors,
choosing to ignore them may reduce the detection cost on them and cut unneces-
sary rollback recoveries. So it is very interesting to design an intelligent transient
faults detector that would be able to catch only harmful errors.
There have been some previous works on studying the probability of errors
being masked at architecture level [24,36]. However, even if an error is manifested
in architectural execution status, the error still does not necessarily cause a wrong
program final result. This occurs, for instance, when the register holding the
faulty value is dynamically dead, or when the computation is such that masks the
faulty operand, or the control flow takes a wrong path but later converges and the
extra instructions that have been executed do not affect the final results (as our
examples in Chapter 4), and so on and so forth. In theses scenarios, the program
intermediate states may be wrong for a while, but at the end it outputs correct
result. We call these errors correct-errors. Our experiments in Section 6.4.3 show
that as high as 72% of injected errors are correct-errors. For this section of errors,
it is totally safe to ignore the error and just let the program continue and finish.
Nothing will be wrong. As a bonus, the time for roll-back recovery is saved. More
importantly, if the error detection system is intelligent enough, the cost that was
used to detect these “safe” errors can be saved too.
If an error causes the program to follow a wrong execution, but the program
results in segmentation fault, the situation is not that bad. Since the operating
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system sends a signal, the user can infer that “something wrong may have hap-
pened”. When this type of error occurs, the program can continue execution since
the operating system will detect it. We call these errors segfault-errors. Some pre-
vious work also use operating system signals as error detectors. Restore [70] and
SWAT [23] find that some errors are very likely to result in abnormal behavior of
the operating system and they use these abnormal behavior as signs of possible
errors. The technique presented in Section 5 takes advantage of this by remov-
ing checks for memory access addresses with the hope that operating system will
detect the errors. However, using operating system as a fault detector can cause
false-positives, since the non-faulty program may have such abnormal behavior.
Therefore, when an abnormal behavior in the operating system is observed, the
system needs to roll-back and re-execute, to determine whether this behavior is
due to an error. In our framework, abnormal behavior signaled by the operating
system only refers to segmentation faults. Since segmentation faults should be
rare for a correct program, the roll-back and re-execution overhead because of a
false-positive alarms should be small.
According to our error classification (see Section 5.2.3), the remaining errors
are those that cause Silent Data Corruption (SDC). These errors are truly harmful.
We call them SDC-errors. Actually, there are not many harmful errors: only 6%
as in our experiments (see Section 6.4.3). If an intelligent fault detector is able
to detect only the SDC-errors, there are two obvious benefits: the system does
not have to roll-back on correct-errors; and the cost that was spent on detecting
correct-errors and segfault-errors can be saved.
However, designing such an intelligent transient fault detector is challenging
because it is very difficult to predict the final result of the program execution when
something unusual has been detected. For the fault detection approaches that do
instruction-level replication (hardware-based or software-based), we need to know
80
which instructions need to be replicated and which values need to be checked in
order to catch harmful errors only. The latter question is more important, because
the need-to-replicate instructions can be obtained from the backward slice of the
need-to-check value, though there are some detailed issues (such as how to handle
loop, procedure calls, memory access, pointers, etc) to find these backward slices.
For prediction-based fault detection approaches, we need to know where or when
to put the symptom or violation detectors to catch harmful errors only. There have
been some previous work discussing where to place violation detectors efficiently.
Nakka et al. [37] select variables based on their fan-out since a variable with a
larger fan-out is more likely to propagate errors to its users. But it is possible
that the error in this variable can be masked by its users, and thus resulting in a
correct output; or it is possible that errors occurring on its users cause undetected
SDC. Therefore, we do not think that the fan-out criteria is good enough for our
goal.
In summary, for an intelligent transient fault detector (no matter which ap-
proach it uses), the key is to determine what is the minimum set of variables so
that, if errors or symptoms are observed on them, then it is likely that the pro-
gram will result in SDC. We name them “SDC-indicating variables”. After this
set is determined, protection can be applied to these variables via instruction-level
replication or prediction-based checking.
Notice that most previous transient fault detectors are designed from an oppo-
site direction. They first decide which protection approach to use, apply the pro-
tection, and then measure the fault coverage and performance overhead. Taking
the likely-invariant scheme [59] (one of the prediction-based fault detection ap-
proaches) for an instance, it first chooses variables that have most likely-invariant
property, places likely-invariant detector on them, trains the detectors and then
prays their detectors can catch most SDC-errors. In this approach, the chosen
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variables are known to have great likely-invariant property, however it is unclear
whether they are good at catching SDC-errors. Maybe some variables can likely
catch correct-errors, leading to unnecessary rollback and diagnosis. And if most
SDC-indicating variables do not have likely-invariant property, this scheme will
miss most SDC-errors. Our design follows an opposite direction. We first find the
variables that can indicate SDC-errors, and then think of how to protect them,
using likely-invariant if applicable or using instruction-level replication or others,
depending on the cost. With our design path, we have more flexibility in matching
different reliability requirement - we can achieve higher fault coverage than pure
likely-invariant scheme or do a balance between reliability and cost.
In the following sections, we will discuss in detail the approach we use to find
these “SDC-indicating variables” and build the intelligent transient fault detector.
Section 7.1 discusses the methods we are using and why we choose this ap-
proach; Section 7.2 gives detailed framework of our design; Section 7.3 presents
our intermediate results; Section 7.4 presents previous work related to this topic;
and finally Section 7.5 concludes this chapter and discusses future work on this
direction.
7.1 Methodology
7.1.1 Metrics of Selecting SDC-indicating Variables
The ideal situation is that by protecting a set of “SDC-indicating variables” all but
only the SDC-errors can be discovered. Here, “protect” a variable means that any
error happening/propagating to that variable can be discovered immediately. Un-
fortunately, such a situation is unlikely to happen. One “SDC-indicating variable”
can indicate a certain number of SDC-errors (number s); it is also likely to indi-
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cate a certain number of segfault-errors (number f), and correct-errors (number
c); and the protection cost varies. We define SDC-coverage, SDC-distinguishability
and protection-cost for each SDC-indicating variable.
SDC-coverage shows how many SDC-errors the SDC-indicating variable can
detect, namely SDC-coverage = s/ (total number of SDC-errors).
SDC-distinguishability gives a sense of how well this SDC-indicating vari-
able can distinguish SDC-errors from other types of errors. SDC-distinguishability
= s/(s+ f + c).
Protection-cost defines the cost to protect this variable. Many factors con-
tribute to the cost, eg. the execution frequency of assignments to the variable, the
size of backward slice for this variable (for instruction-level replication detection
approach), the locality of the variable (for prediction based detection approach),
etc.
For any set of SDC-indicating variables, there is SDC-coverage, SDC- dis-
tinguishability and protection-cost. SDC-coverage stands for the functionality
(fault coverage) of the fault detection; protection-cost reflects the detection over-
head; SDC- distinguishability reflects the efficiency of the detection system. SDC-
distinguishability is a new concept we propose. The higher SDC-distinguishability
means the least unnecessary roll-back. The entire cost for a fault tolerance system
is the sum of the detection cost plus the potential roll-back and diagnosis cost.
(Entire cost for fault tolerance) = (Detection cost) + (Number of errors sig-
nalled) * (Roll-back cost + Diagnosis cost)
As the soft error rate increases, the second component on the right side is
projected to play an important role because the roll-back cost and diagnosis cost
is huge. The SDC-distinguishability metric can help to reduce the number of
errors signalled and substantially mitigate the impact of the second component.
Our design goal is to find a set of SDC-indicating variables with high SDC-
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coverage, high SDC-distinguishability and low protection-cost. There is not a
easy trade-off among them. For example, An variable that may affects outside
(eg. write to shared memory location or access I/O mapped location) must be
SDC-indicating and the SDC-distinguishability is 100% (assuming SDC if errors
propagat to other threads or I/O). But its protection-cost may be very high. For
example, with instruction-level replication approach, if we want to protect all such
variables, the cost would be the same as replicating the whole program.
7.1.2 Our Approach to Find SDC-indicating Variables
To find SDC-indicating variables and predict their SDC-coverage and SDC- dis-
tinguishability, we use an experimental approach. By actually injecting faults
to the program and tracking the error propagation, we will know which affected
variables are SDC-indicating and which are not. We inject a huge number of
errors to a program for avoiding biased results. Experimental fault injection
approaches have been seen on analyzing architectual fault mask probability for
different hardware structures [24, 71], and fault mask probability at instruction
level [13]. However, experimental fault injection approaches may be limited by
inputs: SDC-indicating variables, SDC-coverage and SDC-distinguishability for a
program may vary from one program input to another, which makes the results
hard to trust when program inputs change. Actually, many experimental analy-
sis approaches have similar problem. Taking likely-invariant scheme [59] for an
instance, a variable having invariant property with one input may not have the
same invariant property with a different input, such that a fitted likely-invariant
detector may not work when input changes. To mitigate the impact from different
inputs, the best we can do is to feed in different inputs and try to find proper-
ties that always hold. We think that the most application level error maskability
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comes from the application itself, and depends little on program inputs.
There is an alternative way to find SDC-indicating variables. One can analyze
the error mask probability for every types of operation and then calculate the error
mask probability for every instructions following data-flow. SymPLFIED [46] is
an example of using model-based analysis. It uses symbolic execution to abstract
the state of erroneous values in the program and uses model checking to find errors
that would evade detection and lead to program failure. This kind of model-based
analysis can be done statically, but its comprehensive analysis has bad scalability.
It is said in [46] that the exhaustive search performed by SymPLFIED can be
exponential in the number of instructions executed by the program in the worst
case. Furthermore, a static model-based analysis has several limitations so that we
have to make conservative assumptions and make the analysis results inaccurrate.
For example, when a data is stored to memory, the data flow loses its track and
may not know when and where this data is going to be loaded. Then we have to
assume the stored data will not be masked by later instructions and will finally
contribute to the program output. In addition, if a conditional branch depends on
the input, without knowing input at analysis time, we have to assume execution
flow can follow both jump branches and have to miss the mask probability that
this conditional branch can provide. Considering all these above limitations, we
think experimental fault injection approach would serve our purpose better.
7.2 Framework
In this section, we describe in detail how we determine SDC-indicating variables
and how we use them to build an efficient intelligent transient fault detector.
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7.2.1 Fault Injection
Similar to the fault injection experiment described in Section 5.2.3 and Sec-
tion 6.4.3, we use Pin [26] and inject faults to the binary code excluding system
libraires. For each benchmark run, we randomly select a dynamic instruction and
flip a bit in its output. Since our experiments are performed on a X86 platform,
an instruction output can have different types. if the output is a normal register
we change the register value; if the output value is spilled to memory we change
the memory value; if the output is only a status flag (such as for “cmp” instruc-
tion) we change the status flag. After the fault is injected, the program is run
to completion (unless it aborts) and its output is compared to the correct output
from a golden-run. Depending on the result the error is categorized as correct-
error, segfault-error and SDC-error. Notice that this classification is a little bit
different from the the error classification in Section 5.2.3 and Section 6.4.3 for
simplification purpose. Here, correct-error is the same as unACE; SDC-error is
the same as SDC category; but segfault-error means the error can be noticed by
operating system, including SegFault, Self-Detected (program assertion failure)
and infinite running. To avoid biased results, we inject totally 30,000 faults to
each benchmark.
Some previous work inject faults to microarchitectural level, such as Soft-
Arch [24], ReStore [70] and others. In this way, the injected fault rate and distri-
bution is relatively accurate, however many injected faults would be masked by
the microarchitecture and only a few would manifest as errors in the architectural
status. Since our work focuses on fault maskability by applications, we are model-
ing only those errors that appear in the architectural status. In this way running
experiments on a real machine, our fault injection is very fast so that we are able
to run a program to completion seeing the final output and a large number of
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runs are possible.
Our fault injection implementation misses two types of errors: errors in instruc-
tion opcode and errors in program counter. It could happen that the instruction
decoder is affected by a fault and mistake one opcode to another: if an computa-
tion opcode is mistaken to another computation opcode, we may mimic the effects
by injecting multi-bit errors to the instruction output; if an computation opcode
is mistaken to a store or a store is mistaken to a non-store opcode, the data chain
through memory will be corrupted and it is hard to mimic the effect. An error in
program counter may drive the execution flow jump to a random illegal position,
and cause later instructions operate on wrong source values and generate wrong
outputs. We think it is difficult to correlate the mask probability of the errors
in PC with application properties (instruction type or source code structure or
others), so that we would leave the errors in PC to be protected by a cheap sep-
arate mechanism (refer to the discussion in Section 3.3-III for previous proposed
mechanisms) and don’t include these errors here.
7.2.2 Tracking Error Propagation
A soft error in the architectural execution status may change the correct control
flow, may corrupt the values of variables in register or memory, may propagate
to outside (e.g. I/O). Because a harmful error in control flow will finally corrupt
values of variables or propagate to outside (otherwise the error does not affect
program final output at all), we only monitor values in variables and values that
are going to affect outside world. For the same reason, since SDC-errors must
manifest themselves in stores or system calls, we track only operands of memory
stores and arguments of system calls. Notice that if a register value is spilled to
memory, we don’t treat it as a memory store. For stores to dynamically allocated
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heap variables, since the addresses may vary from one run to another, we don’t
record these addresses. To help to identify which variable is affected by the
error, we also record the instruction PC along with the its operands. Due to
space limitations, we take a record of 9,999 memory stores and system calls after
injecting a fault, and then stop the tracking and let the program complete. We
call the record of these tracking entries a “value trace”.
Sometimes if a fault corrupts the higher bits of the address of a memory
access instruction, we receive a segmentation fault immediately. In this case we
may record just a few store/system call entries or have no value trace at all.
If one fault injection run generates a complete value trace (there is no segmen-
tation fault before the tracking completes), we compare the trace with the correct
records from a golden run. The fault-injected value trace can be exactly the same
as the records from the golden-run, either because the the fault has been masked
before propagating to memory stores and system calls, or because the error is
hidden so deep that it manifests later than 9,999 stores and system calls. The
fault-injected value trace can show some errors in operands of stores or arguments
of systems calls, or mismatch in instruction PCs meaning corrupted control flows.
Figure 7.1 gives two examples of fault-injected value traces (Figure 7.1-(b)(c))
and the corresponding value trace from the golden-run (Figure 7.1-(a)). In these
examples, each line represents a tracking record in a format as follows.
[Serial Numver] [PC of the tracked instruction]:
[the values to be tracked]
In the fault-injected value trace, the serial number in front of every line shows
how far this entry is from where the fault is injected. Here we assume that a
fault-injected value trace keeps only 7 trace records.




















































Figure 7.1: Examples of fault-injected value traces and the corresponding golden-
run value trace. The items in bold italic are found different from the golden-run.
For example, we may track both value and address for a memory store. In our
examples here, we only show one value for each tracked instruction for simplicity
purpose.
Figure 7.1-(b) shows an example of fault-injected value trace where only vari-
able values are different from the golden-run value trace. In Figure 7.1-(c), the
PC starts to mismatch from Line 2, meaning the control flow goes wrong before
it reaches the pc4 instruction.
7.2.3 Finding SDC-indicating Variables
To better see which variables (or instructions that output the variables) are vul-
nerable to faults, we sort the entries in a fault-injected value trace by instruction
(PC). The recorded values for the same instruction are placed in the same order
as they appear in the original value trace. Along with the recorded values, we tag
their serial numbers together. After the sort, we compare the recorded values to
those from the golden-run for each tracked instruction. Once a mismatch is first
found at value V , we stop the comparison for that instruction and flags the serial
number S(V ) tagged with value V . Put in another words, pretending there is
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a perfect value predictor for a tracked instruction I, this perfect value predictor
can catch the error at the position where the S(V )-th store/system call is made.
When control flow is corrupted, the comparison becomes a little complicated.
We use two examples (Figure 7.2-(b)(c)) to show how to sort fault-injected
value trace by instruction PCs and compare them to corresponding golden-run
value trace (Figure 7.2-(a)). In the fault-injected value trace shown in Figure 7.2-
(b), where only values are different from the golden-run value trace, after the
sorting and comparison, the value records for pc1 and pc3 are exactly the same as
the records from the golden-run (we put “pass” for pc1 and pc3) and because the
first mismatched value record for pc2 is “80<2>”, we put “wrong-value<2>” for
pc2. “<2>” is the position for pc2. It means if we have a perfect value predictor
for instruction pc2, we can catch this error when the 2nd memory store/system
call is executed after the error is injected. The example shown in Figure 7.2-(c) is a
little complicated, because the control flow is corrupted and the instruction pc5 is
executed in a place where it should not be. As a result, the tracking records from
pc2 and pc3 are not in their correct positions. After the sorting, we find that the
value records for pc2 are still the same as the records from the golden-run but the
tagged serial number starts not to match at position 5 (“wrong-order<5>”); pc3
misses a value record in the end (“miss”), and the serial number at position 6 does
not match (“wrong-order<6>”); and pc5 has an extra value record at position 4
(“extra<4>”). If an instruction has more than one symptoms at the same time,
such as pc3 having “miss” and “wrong-order<6>”, we only record one symptom
that is the most important. In our definition, a symptom with smaller position is
considered more important. For instructions having “wrong-order”, “miss” and
“extra” symptoms, even if we have a perfect value predictor, we may not be able
to catch the error within the limited detection period. We call these control-flow-
based symptoms. Here, the word “symptom” refers to how a variables is impacted
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total wrong-value wrong-order miss extra
PC
Table 7.1: The variable-symptom table headings. Every cubic in the table shows
how many times a variable behaves a particular symptom
from errors.
When the sorting and comparison is done, we can easily see which variables
(instructions that produce the variables) are likely to be affected by injected faults
and how they are affected, in variables values or by wrong control flow.
Considering all injected faults with which the value traces are complete, we
count how many faults get the symptoms of “wrong-value”, “wrong-order”, “miss”
and “extra” for each tracked variable (PC). Table 7.1 shows the table headings
that we use for this fault impact statistics. The table is called variable-symptom
table.
Because we know the final program result for each injected fault, we can do
the same fault impact statistics for only SDC-errors. Now we have one variable-
symptom table for all injected faults (excluding those without complete value
traces) and one variable-symptom table for SDC-errors. If there is a perfect
symptom predictor, we can catch errors that show such a symptom. Thus, the
numbers in the variable-symptom table for SDC-errors reflect SDC-coverage, and
the ratio of the numbers in the variable-symptom table for SDC-errors over the
corresponding numbers in the variable-symptom table for all faults mean SDC-
distinguishability. Therefore, we can choose SDC-indicating variables based on







































































Figure 7.2: Examples of sorting fault-injected value traces by instruction PCs,
and comparing the sorted value traces to corresponding golden-run value trace.
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7.2.4 Building Real World Intelligent Error Detector
In the previous subsection, we assume a perfect symptom predictor to catch er-
rors that cause such symptoms as “wrong-value”, “wrong-order”, “miss”, “extra”.
However, if we consider the cost, it is impractical to implement such perfect symp-
tom predictors in hardware or software. As a result, we can not simply choose to
protect those variables that have high SDC-coverage and SDC-distinguishability.
We have to take into account how much effort it is required to protect each vari-
able. In this subsection, we describe how we make use of the statistics calculated
in the previous subsection to build an intelligent efficient error detector. We
consider the whole detector a combination of separate detection mechanisms.
First, we pick the variables whose SDC-distinguishability exceed a certain
threshold. We would first try 80%. If we are not satisfied with this number, we
can adjust it later. Notice that SDC-distinguishability is calculated for every pair
of variable (PC) and symptom.
For every chosen pair of variable and symptom, we try to find “cheap” pro-
tection mechanism and evalute the cost for that pair.
I If the symptom is value-based, namely “wrong-value”, we will profile the
program and see how easy to build a likely-invariant checker [59] or a
perturbation-based screener [49] or other kinds of value predictors for this
variable (PC). If nothing fits at all, we estimate the effort to replicate the
instructions in the backward slice for this variable.
II If the symptom is control-flow-based, namely “wrong-order”, “miss”, “ex-
tra”, we trace back from the chosen variable and try to find the place that
makes the control flow go wrong. Notice that in our tracking framework,
we only track variables that may go to memory or outside. There are much
more internal variables we don’t track, but they can be SDC-indicating and
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cheap to protect. For example, there must be some internal variables in
the error propagation path that steer the control flow to wrong directions
and finally cause control-flow-based symptoms on the outgoing variables.
We can not track all internal variables due to time and space limit. What
we do is we track outgoing variables and once we see interesting control-
flow-based symptoms on the tracked variables we trace back to find those
critical internal variables. Then we can use the method mentioned in I for
the “wrong-value” symptom to protect these critical internal variables.
It could happen that there is no cheap protection at all for a pair of variable
and symptom. Then we have give up protecting that pair. Notice that one pair
may have overlap with another pair in terms of SDC-coverage. We don’t have
to design separate protection mechanism for every pair of variable and symptom.
But we need to examine the overlap to minimize the protection efforts.
Down to the real world, the statistical SDC-coverage and SDC-distinguishablity
is just an upper bound. It is expected that the designed likely-invariance checker
or the perturbation-based screener do not catch all errors and may sometimes pro-
duce false positives. In this case, with the profile knowledge, we need to update
the SDC-coverage into a closer number that we can achieve.
If the entire SDC-coverage from all the pairs that we can protect is not enough,
we need to relax the threshold on SDC-distinguishability and choose more pairs
of variable and go back to the first step.
7.2.5 Bounding Fault Detection Latency
In our intelligent fault detection system, we assume a underneath checkpoint layer
to support roll-back recovery whenever an error is detected or suspected. To make
sure the checkpoint-recovery layer is able to recover properly in case of error, we
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must bound the latency between the fault occurring and the fault being detected.
Our fault detection framework is very natural in bounding fault detection
latency. Recall that after the sorting and comparison, we record for each faulty
instruction not only the symptom it behaves due to the error, but also the position
the symptom occurs. The position is the number inside the “<>” in Figure 7.2,
telling how far (in terms of the number of memory stores/system calls) the symp-
tom occurs since the error is injected. Given a maximum detection latency, if
we can catch all symptoms whose positions are within the bound, we are doing
the best we can. Therefore, if we count only variable-symptom pairs whose po-
sitions are within the given bound when we build the variable-symptom table,
the priority for choosing which variable-symptom pairs to protect will be given to
symptoms that are close to where the error first manifests in architectural status.
Notice that when our fault detector catches a symptom that occurs within the
given detection latency, the detector is still capable to catch the same symptom
that happens later than the given detection latency (meaning that the causing
error hasn’t been caught elsewhere before). In this case, although the underneath
checkpoint layer is not able to do correct roll-back recovery, it is still better to
report the error than just letting the harmful error sneak away.
Besides SDC-errors, we also have to consider bounding fault detection la-
tency for segfault-errors. Although in our primitive design we intentionally leave
segfault-errors to the operating system for protection, it is possible that operating
system reacts too late so that the checkpoint recovery layer can not do proper roll-
back. We can tell these “late reaction” by looking at where the program crashes
(segmentation fault or failing program assertion) from the value trace point of
view. For example, if the program crashes after the 9,999 tracking entries com-
plete, the detection latency for this error caught by operating system is longer
than 9,999 memory stores/system calls. We must treat late reaction segfault-
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errors the same as SDC-errors, in order to properly bound the detection latency
for all errors.
The last question is whether the number of memory stores/system calls is a
proper unit to count the detection latency. Some previous work use the number
of dynamic instructions to count the detection latency [23, 49, 70]. Those papers
suggest a pipeline flush to implement the recovery, so that the detection latency
must be bounded by the length of the pipeline, which is counted in the number of
instructions. In our work, we assume a software/hardware checkpoint and recovery
layer that is relatively cheap and can sustain long detection latency. (Although
the recovery expense is very high, the impact to overall performance is little
if the error rate and the false positive rate is small.) Such a software/hardware
checkpoint and recovery layer makes snapshot of architectural status, records lists
of the memory data that differ in the checkpoint, and holds the values that may
go outside. Therefore, how much detection latency the checkpoint and recovery
layer can support depends on the number of memory updates and I/Os it can
hold. This unit is just what we use to bound the detection latency in our fault
detector design.
7.3 Intermediate Results
In this section, we present preliminary results from our experiments on two
SPECINT2000 benchmarks, gzip and twolf.
7.3.1 About Application Fault Mask Probability
We performed our fault injection experiments as described in Section 7.2 and
injected 30,000 faults to each benchmark. The fault injection results show that




















































































Figure 7.3: Software Fault Mask Probability.
our results from previous fault injection experiments presented in Section 6.4.3.
Only 2.6% errors in gzip and 31.1% errors in twolf cause Silent Data Corruption,
the most harmful errors we want to prevent. And 62.5% errors in gzip and 62.4%
errors in twolf do not corrupt program output at all. Thus, we can consider that
62.5% and 62.4% are the fault mask probability of the application.
Instruction and control-flow error derating.
Figure 7.3 shows detailed impacts on our tracked value traces from injected
faults. In our experiments, for each injected fault, we track 9,999 memory stores
and system calls after the fault is injected. If the tracking completes and all
entries in the resulting value trace match the records from the golden-run, it
means the fault does not propagate to memory stores or system calls at all (faults
are masked by some instructions or control flow jumps), or the fault is hidden too
deep so that it does not manifest in our trace within 9,999 entries. Actually, we
observe a few deep-hidden faults in experiments on gzip, where a loop induction
variable is corrupted. The loop induction variable contributes only to counting
loop iterations. So after the induction variable becomes incorrect, everything else
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inside the loop is still correct – we see correct value trace, until the loop is to
finish where our tracking has already stopped before. Fortunately, these deep-
hidden faults at last fail program assertions and attract our attention. An error
is derated if it does not manifest in the final program output. If we just pretend a
9,999-entry value trace is long enough to catch all manifested errors, the fraction
of “matched complete value traces” represents the probability of error derating
from instructions and control-flow jumps. Figure 7.3 shows that the instruction
and control-flow derating rate is 52,9% for gzip, 46.7% for twolf. Cook et. al show
that the average instruction-level derating rate on SPECINT2000 benchmarks is
35.9% [13], lower than our numbers here. There are two reasons for this difference:
1) Our numbers include control flow derating. If a conditional branch is affected
by an error and goes wrong direction but no memory writes or system calls are
affected by this fault, we count the case in the derating rate, which is not by
Cook. 2) In their experiments, faults are also injected to instruction opcode
which we don’t do. The faults in instruction opcode usually can not be masked
by instructions. So their overall error derating rate is lower than ours.
Application error derating. Our experiments show more error derating
opportunity than just instruction and control-flow error derating: for gzip 9.64%
errors corrupt value trace but in the end don’t corrupt the final program output;
for twolf, the number is 15.7%. Furthermore, for those segfault-errors that corrupt
value trace (24.3% for gzip) we can leave operating system to detect them. After
all, the most harmful errors are those causing SDC.
7.3.2 Exploring SDC-indicating Variables
gzip
For gzip, we totally track 342 out-going variables (outputs of memory stores/system
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calls) all over the whole program. Among them, 261 variables have symptoms for
all injected faults, and 145 variables have symptoms for SDC-errors. Following
the instructions in Section 7.2.4, we calculate SDC-distinguishability and SDC-
coverage for every pair of variable and symptom that SDC-errors cause. After
setting the threshold for SDC-distinguishability as 80%, we choose 101 variable-
symptom pairs, including 30 value-based symptom pairs and 71 control-flow-based
symptom pairs.
Since control-flow-based symptom pairs take a large portion, we investigate
the program code and try to find internal values that are in the error propagation
path and lead to the symptom happening. We find that 339 SDC-errors propagate
to the return value of function ct tally(), which drives the control flow into calling
flush block() earlier or later than it should. The good thing is that ct tally()
should return a boolean value, 1 or 0. A very simple range detector for the return
value on the caller side can catch most of these errors if the return value is found
to be not 1 or 0. From our profile, 328 SDC-errors can be detected by this simple
range detector and there is no false positive at all, meaning 42.3% SDC-coverage,
100% SDC-distinguishability and near zero protection-cost. If we want to cover
more SDC-errors, we may need to relax the threshold for SDC-distinguishability,
which we haven’t done.
twolf
For twolf, we track 1342 outgoing variables through out the whole program.
Among them, 682 variables have symptoms for all injected faults and 635 variables
have symptoms for SDC-errors. After setting the threshold for SDC-distinguishability
as 80%, we choose 1574 variable-symptom pairs, including 1005 value-based symp-
tom pairs and 569 control-flow-based symptom pairs.
Since value-based symptom pairs take a large portion, we can just look at the
chosen variables and try to build cheap error detection mechanisms for them. We
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variable function SDC-coverage SDC-disinguishability
var1 new dbox() 90.6% 93.8%
var2 new dbox a() 94.3% 88.6%
var3 new dbox a() 88.5% 92.0%
Table 7.2: Three chosen variables to protect in twolf




Table 7.3: Range profiles for the chosen three chosen variables
don’t do a thorough study on all chosen variables. We randomly choose three
variable-symptom pair which have relatively high SDC-coverage and high SDC-
distinguishability shown in Table 7.2.
From the table, we can see that if there is a perfect value predictor for any one
of the three variables, we can detect around 90% SDC-errors and pay little expense
on unnecessary rollback and recovery. However, such a perfect value predictor do
not come for free. In our experiment, we place a very simple range detector for
each of the variables. The range detector monitors two properties for a variable:
the value of the variable, and the stride from the previous value to the current
value of this variable. If the value or the stride violates the profiled range, the
range detector will trigger an alarm. The performance overhead for such a range
detector on these three variables is 1.3% over the non-protected program. The last
two columns in Table 7.3 show the two ranges for each variable from the profile of
twolf. We turn on the simple range detectors and do fault injection. We inject the
same 30,000 faults as we did , and find that the simple range detectors can catch
3928 SDC-errors (42.0% SDC-coverage), 2 segfault-errors and only 580 correct-
errors (87.1% SDC-distinguishability). Notice that there are 4716 correct-errors
having mismatched value traces (see Figure 7.3), all these 4716 correct-errors
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could cause false positives. We avoid most of them. From the Table 7.3, it can
be seen that we don’t intentionally pick variables with narrow ranges. If strictly
following instructions given in Section 7.2.4, we should profile all variables from
1005 value-based symptoms that satisfy SDC-distinguishability threshold and pick
variables with narrow ranges and high SDC-coverage. In this way, we will surely
achieve higher SDC-coverage and suffer less false positives.
7.3.3 Measuring Fault Detection Latency
In our preliminary experiments, we do not follow what we have discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2.5 to bound the detection latency for detected errors. Now we just measure
the fault detection latency for the systems we construct in last section, in which
only a simple range protector is applied to the chosen variables. The purpose of
this measurement is to see how difficult it is to bound the detection latency. If a
range protector triggers an alarm, we measure the distance between the instruc-
tion where the fault is injected and instruction where the alarm is triggered. If
the system triggers am alarm, in a form of segmentation fault or assertion failure,
we also measure the distance between where the fault is injected and where the
alarm is triggered. Figure 7.4 shows the results. Every benchmark has three bars,
representing the percentage of segfault-errors, SDC-errors and correct-errors over
the total number injected errors, respectively. For each bar, errors are classified
into eight categories based on how soon they can be detected or can not be de-
tected at all. The “no trace” category means the the system triggers an alarm very
quickly, before the execution reaches a tracked instruction. A tracked instruction
is a memory store or a system call instruction.
The results show that for gzip, all detected SDC-errors can be bounded within































Figure 7.4: Fault detection rate and fault detection latency with simple protectors.
bounded within 10,000 tracked instructions. The reason is that the segfault-
errors here include not only 3374 errors that cause segmentation fault, but also
7084 errors that fail programmer assertions. For the latter section of errors, the
errors are hidden so deep that it usually takes very long for programmer assertions
to detect them. Therefore, if we want to bound error detection latency, we should
treat these segfault-errors with long detection latency as SDC-errors and find the
proper variables to protect them.
For twolf, the results show that 98.7% of detected segfault-errors occur im-
mediately after the fault is injected, before any instruction is recorded. 82.6%
of detected SDC-errors can be bounded within 5 tracked instructions and 98.1%
within 100 tracked instructions. All detected SDC-errros can be detected within
9,999 tracked instructions. In short, this constructed fault detector (simple range
protector on these chosen variables) can detect 88.1% of detected segfault-errors
and detected SDC-errors within 5 tracked instructions, and detect 98.6% within
100 tracked instructions.
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7.4 Related Previous Work
We compare this work to previous work in two aspects.
7.4.1 Fault Masking
When the hardware is attacked by alpha particles or energy neutrons, the fault
may be masked at micro-architecture level, architecture level, instruction level
or application level. Mukherjee et. al [36] and Li et. al [24] study the error
mask probability on some structures at architectural-level and use experimental
method to predict the architectural error derating. Several works are proposed to
ignore errors that will be masked by architecture or instructions. Weaver et al. [73]
modifies the error reporting mechanism and not to signal detected errors that only
affect dynamically dead instructions. Cook et. al [13] observe six categories of
instruction level error derating and propose in DMR system to check two register
status periodically so that the errors that can be masked by instructions will not
be detected. In this chapter, we focus on instruction level and application level
fault masking and we are the first to propose an intelligent fault detector that
is able to only detect errors that are not to be masked by instructions and the
application.
7.4.2 Invariance-based Fault Detection
The invariance-based fault detection mechanism is a subclass of prediction-based
fault detection approaches (refer to Section 2.2.1). Because value can have local-
ities, a profile of expected values can be established from historical information
or current processor state. When current value is found outside of the profile, a
warning will be indicated. There have been some work using value invariance vio-
lation detector to find transient errors. Racunas et. al [49] uses value perturbation
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screeners to detect hardware transient errors. Sahoo et. al [59] find variables that
have likely invariance property from training runs, and place invariance detector
on the field to catch hardware permanent errors. Our work is different from the
above invariance-based fault detection mechanisms in two aspects: i) they choose
to monitor variables that have most locality property. It is true that monitoring
these variables will get low false positives. But it is possible that the caught er-
rors (if they are not false positives) will be masked by later instructions or the
application. In our work, we choose variables firstly based on their capability to
indicate SDC-errors. 2) we use invariance-based fault detection mechanisms to
protect the chosen variables, but we are not restricted to these mechanisms. We
first find the variables that can indicate SDC-errors, and then think of how to
protect them, using likely-invariants if applicable or using instruction-level repli-
cation or others, depending on the cost. Therefore, we have larger space to play
in SDC coverage. In the case that all variables in the program have little invari-
ance property, the pure invariance-based detection mechanism will fail catching
SDC-errors. While we can choose instruction-level replication to protect chosen
SDC-indicating variables.
7.5 Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter presents an interesting research direction on designing an intelligent
fault detector that is able to catch only harmful errors to a program. If a fault
detector can automatically ignore errors that will be ultimately masked by the
application we can save unnecessary roll-back recovery and the cost spent on
detecting the non-harmful errors. The most harmful errors to a program are errors
that will cause Silent Data Corruption. The key task to design an intelligent fault
detector is to determine a set of SDC-indicating variables. By protecting them,
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most SDC-errors but few other types of errors can be caught (high SDC-coverage
and high SDC-distinguishability). At the same time we need to consider the
fault detection mechanisms for these variables (low protection-cost) and bring the
protection cost into the trade off between fault coverage and performance.
We use experimental methods to find the set of SDC-indicating variables to
protect. By injecting and tracking a lot of architectual execution errors, we get
a statistical knowledge of which variables and what symptoms on these variables
are most likely to suggest SDC-errors. Then these variables and their symptoms
can be chosen to protect. If the symptom is value-based, we can try invariant-
based error detection mechanisms to protect them; if the symptom is control-
flow based, we look into the code and find some internal variables that are on
the error propagation path and cause such control-flow based symptoms. Then
we can use invariant-based error detection mechanisms to protect the internal
variables. The final variables chosen to protect depends on their SDC-coverage,
SDC-distinguishability and their protection-cost. We also discuss how to bound
the error detection latency when choosing SDC-indicating variables.
We did preliminary experiments on two SpecINT2000 benchmarks, gzip and
twolf. For gzip, we find that with a very simple 0-1 value checker on a function
return value, we can detect 42.3% SDC-errors without any false positives (errors
that will be ultimately masked). For twolf, we randomly choose 3 variables with
high SDC-coverage, high SDC-distinguishability. By applying simple range vio-
lation detectors on them, we can catch 42.0% SDC-errors, and only 12.3% of all
false positives.
In the future, we have the following tasks to do on this direction.
I Do experiments on more benchmarks to show the efficiency and intelligence
of our fault detector design.
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II For control-flow-based symptoms, we need to find the internal variables that
on the error propagation path and do not mask the error. Currently, we do
this by manually investigating into the code. We need to automate the pro-
cess. For value-based symptoms, we need to profile the invariance properties
on them and evaluate the protection efficiency. In our experiments, we just
try simple range violation checkers. We can try more invariant properties
and automate the process.
III On the stage when we know which variables and what symptoms are likely to
suggest SDC-errors and how much protection cost they may cause, it is still
not easy to choose the best set of variables and symptoms that can achieve
high SDC-coverage, high SDC-distinguishability and low protection cost.
There are many challenges here: different variables may have overlap on
errors that they can indicate; an invariant-based error detector can not catch
all errors on the protected variables and may introduce false positives, which
makes the statistical SDC-coverage and SDC-distinguishability not accurate;
the protection cost of replicating a backward slice is hard to predict; it is
very hard to do trade-offs between the three metrics; etc. On this chapter,
we just list all the issues we have to consider when we choose which variables
to protect and propose an incremental approach on the choosing process.




In this dissertation, we propose three techniques for efficient software checking.
First, we identify a code pattern that corresponds to outcome tolerant branches,
and develop a compiler algorithm that finds these patterns, avoiding unnecessary
replication and checking. Second, we evaluate the removal of address checks for
loads and stores, and analyze situations where these checks can be removed with
little loss of fault coverage. We also identify the check and replicated registers
that can be removed on a register safe platform. Third, we present ESoftCheck,
a set of compiler techniques that reduce the overheads of software approaches
for fault tolerance. To the best of our knowledge ESoftCheck is the first work
that identifies the checks before loads, stores and synchronization instructions
that can be removed without sacrificing fault coverage. ESoftCheck also takes
into account the location of checkpoints, so that recovery is not compromised.
When the register file is hardware-protected ESoftCheck can not only remove
many checks but also deallocate replicated registers, reducing register pressure
significantly. We also discuss our future work to find SDC-indicating variables
and design an intelligent fault detector that can most likely detect only halmful
errors, so that for the errors that will be masked by instructions and applications,
the cost spent on detecting them and unnecessary rollbacks can be saved.
Our proposed techniques can be applied to meet different reliability and per-
formance requirements:
If full fault coverage is required and no hardware support is provided, we have
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to use software checking approach to replicate instructions and pay high perfor-
mance overhead (116% over the original non-protected code). Then we can apply
ESoftCheck framework to remove non-vital checks and decrease the performance
overhead to 70%. If the application has many short-cut paths, then we can ap-
ply the boolean logic optimization to further improve performance without losing
fault coverage. Notice that not all applications require such a high fault coverage,
such as cellphone applications, entertainment applications, etc. However, there
are still some applications that need almost full fault coverage. If hardware mod-
ification is impractical in these enviroment, we have to pay the 70% performance
overhead to meet the reliabilty goal.
If the requirement for the fault coverage is high but not as high as the first
case, we can do the following as the fault coverage requirement decreases. 1)
Adjust the knob of degree of trustiness in ESoftCheck to remove more non-vital
checks. 2) Apply the technique of removing address checks before loads. 3) Apply
the technique of removing address checks before loads and stores. When we apply
the above techniques, some of vital checks may be removed and some errors may
cause SDC without being detected (1.44% SDC if applying the removal of address
checks before loads and stores alone). It also could happen that the system can
not properly recover when an error is detected, because the error detection latency
exceeds the capacity that the underneath checkpoint-rollback layer can support. If
the removal of address checks before loads and stores is applied alone on top of the
baseline fully replicated software checking, it improves the performance by 24.8%,
but increases SDC rate to 1.44%. And 4.6% of the detected errors (equivalent to
2.1% of the total injected errors) can not be detected within 100,000 instructions.
If the removal of address checks are applied on top of ESoftCheck, we expect
to lower the performance overhead below 70%. And the 1.44% SDC is quite
acceptable because the real probability of the SDC rate that we can observe is
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1.44% multiplied by the raw SER rate and the probability of errors propagated to
architectural states, which are small numbers. The number of 2.1% for unbounded
errors is acceptable for the same reason.
If the requirements decrease even more, we can selectively protect some mod-
ules in an application or provide some special hardware support if possible (eg.
load value queue, store value queue, hardware checks, etc). Our three techniques
can still be applied on top of it to reduce performance overhead.
If the budget on performance overhead is very tight, we can do symptom-based
software checking for the application. Then the technique that has been discussed
as our future work, detecting only harmful errors, can help to increase the system
efficiency and flexibility by only placing the limited resources to the key places,
where the varialbes that are monitored by the fault detection system are most
likely to detect harmful errors. Our preliminary results show that we can detect
more than 40% SDC errors with little performance overhead (negligible overhead
for gzip and 1.3% overhead for twolf).
In a summary, software checking approaches are very promising in the near
future when the impact of transient faults on commodity processors becomes se-
rious. Software checking approaches need little hardware modification and can be
configured to meet different reliability requirements. Although the performance
overhead is a little bit high compared to hardware-based approaches, in the situa-
tions where the budget is tight one has to pay the price on hardware design or on
performance if high reliability is required. For software checking approaches, the
price can be only paid to applications that need good reliability so that the casual
applications running on the same machine are not affected. In order to make
software checking approaches more attractive, we have proposed three techniques
and discussed one future work that can greatly reduce the performance overhead
of software checking approaches and maintain a similar reliability. Our techniques
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can be combined with other varied software checking techniques to meet different
requirements for reliability and performance.
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